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CONTRACTS AND FRIENDSHIPS
Ethan J Leib*
ABSTRACT
This Article aims to give the relational theory of contract new life,
sharpening some of its claims against its competitors by refracting its theory of
relational contracts through an analogy to friendship. In drawing the analogy
between friendships and relational contracts and revealing their
morphological similarities, this Article offers a provocative window into
friendship's contractual structure-and into relational contracts'
approximation offriendships. The analogy developed here is poised to replace
the "relational contract as marriage" model prevalent among relationalists.
This new model is more honest to relational contract theory and to marriage-
and helps relational contract theory produce some new insights, support old
ones, and revise some of its normative agenda.
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INTRODUCTION
It is likely true that marriages are types of contracts.1 But contracts are not
generally like marriages. Friendships are also, in part, types of contracts. Yet
many contracts are also like friendships. At the least, it is more illuminating to
think of contracts as friendships than as marriages. Let me explain.
For some time, so-called "relational" contract theorists2-theorists who
urge us to focus on "relational" elements in contracts in order to devise a
theory and law of contracts 3 -have sought to convince us that the majority of
contracts, particularly the most relational ones, are types of marriages. 4 More
1 For a maximalist version of this thesis, see, for example, Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There's
No 'IDo': A Model for Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REv. 1019, 1047 (1995)
("Modem marriages are ... tantamount to contractual relationships.").2 This group is usually taken to include Ian Macneil, Stewart Macaulay, Richard Speidel, and Jay
Feinman. This Article largely addresses the work of those relational contract theorists who are essentially
legal scholars, not theorists of relational contracting in economics, organizational theory, history, and
sociology, though some aspects of these approaches do inform several of my arguments here. For some
examples of the work in this latter group, see Naomi R. Lamoreaux et al., Beyond Markets and Hierarchies:
Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History, 108 AM. HMST. REv. 404 (2003) (explaining how
relational contracting can be a useful-and causal-response to changing economic organization); Charles F.
Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Neither Modularity nor Relational Contracting: Inter-firm Collaboration in the New
Economy, 5 ENTERPRISE & SoC'Y 388 (2004) (criticizing some ways of writing business history and some
ways of thinking about informality within relational contracting); George Baker et al., Contracting for Control
(Mar. 21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/Contracts+Conf+-+
April+7-8,+2006+-+Paper+-+Gibbons?exclusive=filemgr.download&file id=961193&showthumb=O (arguing
that although many firms contract with informality in relational contracting environments, firms are not
indifferent to enforcement mechanisms and will try to contract to control temptations to renege); Oliver Hart &
John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Discussion Paper No. 572, 2006), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin center/papers/pdf/
HartMoore 572.pdf (exploring some of the challenges of developing efficient long-term contracts in light of
elements of such contracts that simply cannot be enforced by courts). Thanks to Bob Scott for some guidance
in this literature.
3 For a recent effort to specify the commitments of relational contract theory clearly, see Dori Kimel,
The Choice of Paradigm for Theory of Contract: Reflections on the Relational Model, 27 OxFoRD J. LEGAL
STUD. 233 (2007).
4 See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 15, 22,29,68, 91 (1980); Robert W. Gordon,
Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 569
("[P]arties [to relational contracts] treat their contracts ... like marriages .... ); Kimel, supra note 3, at 245;
John Wightman, Intimate Relationships, Relational Contract Theory, and the Reach of Contract, 8 FEMINIST
LEGAL STU. 93, 100 n.23, 102 (2000); see also Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and
the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REv. 927, 964 (1990) (exploring how franchising
relationships-quintessentially treated as relational contracts-are like marriages); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 65 (1963) ("A breach of
contract law suit may settle a particular dispute, but such an action often results in a 'divorce' ending the
'marriage' between the two businesses."); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A
New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REv. 204 (1982) (exploring how marriages are like relational
contracts).
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modestly, perhaps, they suggest that marriage is a good analogy for relational
contracting. Even those sympathetic to the law and economics movement have
suggested the equivalence between relational contracts and marriages.5
The core idea of "relational contract as marriage" is that most contracts,
like marriages, share the following properties: (1) they ensnare parties into-
and control party compliance through-a thick set of social norms; (2) they
generally give parties autonomy in resolving internal disputes through those
social norms; (3) they are very costly to exit; (4) they leave many terms open;
(5) they tend to be incomplete in specifying obligations, especially on the issue
of how the parties will cooperate over time; (6) parties tend to presume good
faith and best efforts in performance and tend to allow for easy modifications
for changed circumstances; and (7) they establish interdependence, partiality,
and solidarity. Indeed, some have even examined the equivalence between
marriages and relational contracts to determine what the content of marital law
6ought to be. The purchase of the analogy for relationalists, however, is tied up
with their most general point-that discrete, one-shot transactions between
strangers have occupied the center of "classical" contract law and contract
theory to its detriment. In reality, as relationalists have demonstrated since the
1960s, contracts involve thicker relationships than those among strangers.
Indeed, we cannot understand the social or legal practice of contracting as a
practice among strangers; this insight alone has dramatic implications for our
entire market economy and our effort to regulate it through contract law and
otherwise.
This Article makes an effort to replace the marriage analogy in relational
contract thinking with a story that ties contracts and friendships closer
together. Part I is a brief overview of relational contract theory (as it is
conceptualized by contracts scholars in law schools). Part II highlights how
friendships are very much like relational contracts and how friendship can be
illuminated by exposing its morphological similarity to relational contracts.
Part III argues that friendship rather than marriage should be viewed as the
paradigmatic relational contract. And Part IV explores some of the legal and
theoretical ramifications for contract law and theory in light of the view that
friendships are types of relational contracts and relational contracts are types of
friendships. Ultimately, this window into relational contracts and friendships
furnishes a few important lessons. First, it supports the legal enforceability of
5 ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 160 (2000) ("A contract is a kind of marriage.").
6 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1998).
[Vol. 59
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some contracts, both explicit and implicit, between friends. Second, it supports
and revises certain prescriptions of relational contract theory. Third, it helps us
better understand the relationship between social norms and legal norms.
Finally, understanding relational contracts as friendships helps us make better
sense of the under-compensatory nature of contractual remedies.
Let me not overstate the thesis here: I am not building a general theory of
friendship or contract. This Article only suggests that putting these social
practices side-by-side and exposing their morphological similarities can help
illuminate each practice. Certainly, if pressed, some relationalists might
concede that the place of marriage in relational contract theory is only as a
suggestive analogy. This Article proposes that friendship offers a better and
more illuminating analogy that can do some modest work in advancing our
understanding of contract doctrine and theory.
I. RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY: A SYMPATHETIC RECONSTRUCTION
As many have observed, it is a difficult business to summarize relational
contract theory.7 There are many "relationalists" and even some who view
themselves as critics of relational contract theory concede that "we are all
relationalists now.",8 For my purposes, a quick sketch of relational contract
theory should be sufficient.
At the center of relational contract theory is an empirical observation about
the real world of contracting, a related effort to reorient the paradigm under
which contract theory is organized and analyzed, and a set of normative and
doctrinal prescriptions for how to apply contract law to disputing parties. It is
probably fair to say that it is only the empirical observation (and a moderate
form of it, to boot) that the critics of relational contract theory are willing to
concede. The other dimensions of the theory are embraced by those I describe
as "relationalists"--adherents of relational contract theory.
7 See, e.g., DOuR KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT
80-81 (2003) (noting that relational contract theory literature "does not speak in one voice").
8 Although often credited to Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U.
L. REv. 847, 852 (2000), the phrase appeared earlier in a 1992 essay by Randy E. Barnett. Randy E. Barnett,
Conflicting Visions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 VA. L. REv. 1175, 1200
(1992); see also Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L.
REv. 823, 845 n.86 (2000) ("Scott now states that '[w]e are all relationalists.' Nonsense. Those advocating
the virulent strain of the new formalists are .. .[not] relationalists and the sooner we say so the better."
(citation omitted)).
2010]
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A. The Empirical Claim
The empirical observation that commands consensus is that many contracts
in the real world involve long-term, complex relationships and are not merely"one-shot," discrete transactions. In these "relational contracts," social norms
often seem to play a larger role in controlling the parties' conduct than the
threat of legal sanctions.9 Trust and social solidarity tend to underwrite and
support (and, in turn, tend to be underwritten and supported by) these types of
contracts, and informal cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are typical
in contractual relations. In these types of relationships, parties expect some
form of loyalty.
Although contracts between strangers are, of course, possible, relational
contract theory emphasizes that many contracts do not show this pattern of
"strangership." In contrast, relationalists highlight just how often contracts are
formed between parties who are otherwise connected in pre-existing and
ongoing relationships. 10 Moreover, relationalists observe that when parties
9 This insight is often traced to the pioneering work of Stewart Macaulay. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay,
Changing a Continuing Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal with It: Automobile
Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 483; Stewart Macaulay, Elegant
Models, Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 507 (1977); Macaulay,
supra note 4. People also like to cite Bob Ellickson's important book here, along with an early piece by Lisa
Bernstein. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991);
Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21
J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); see also David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104
HARV. L. REv. 375 (1990).
It should be noted, however, that some have found that even in relational contracts, legal and formal
contracting serve a core function of forging trust. See Simon Deakin et al., Contract Law, Trust Relations, and
Incentives for Cooperation: A Comparative Study, in CONTRACTS, CO-OPERATION, AND COMPETITION 110
(Simon Deakin & Jonathan Michie eds., 1997).
10 For some recent evidence of the affective nature of many business relationships, see Paul Ingram & Xi
Zou, Business Friendships, 28 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 167 (2008); Paul Ingram & Arik Lifschitz, Kinship in the
Shadow of the Corporation: The Interbuilder Network in Clyde River Shipbuilding, 1711-1990, 71 AM. Soc.
REv. 334 (2006); and Paul Ingram & Peter W. Roberts, Friendships Among Competitors in the Sydney Hotel
Industry, 106 AM. J. Soc. 387 (2000). Ingram & Zou observe that "[b]usiness friendships represent substantial
benefits to careers and organizational performance, and they are becoming more common." Ingram & Zou,
supra at 182. They are, however, clear that this fact is not without costs: "[B]usiness friendships also represent
notable psychic, social and cultural tensions .... " Id. Still, they are also clear that "the option of segregating
economic and social worlds is not available to contemporary business people." Id.
It is worth noting that much of Ingram's work is devoted to horizontal ties in business-affective
relationships among competitors-rather than vertical ties among buyers and sellers, who are likely to be
engaged in contractual relations as well. For some useful work on vertical ties in business, see Paul DiMaggio
& Hugh Louch, Socially Embedded Consumer Transactions: For What Kinds of Purchases Do People Most
Often Use Networks?, 63 AM. Soc. REv. 619 (1998); Vincenzo Perrone et al., Free to Be Trusted?
Organizational Constraints on Trust in Boundary Spanners, 14 ORG. Sci. 422 (2003); Brian Uzzi,
Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Relations and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking
[Vol. 59
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find themselves in such ongoing relationships, contractual behavior tends to be
driven by informal and implicit dimensions of their mutual understandings
11
within the relationship, rather than "paper" deals and strict adherence to
formalities. 12
This is not terribly controversial stuff, though it took a while for these
insights to be fully understood and incorporated into mainstream contracts
thinking. 13 To the extent that one hears that "we are all relationalists now," all
this statement means is that most people have embraced the relationalists'
empirical observation. Two significant cleavages between relationalists and
non-relationalists have nevertheless emerged from this now widely accepted
empirical observation. The disagreements are about what follows from the
observation as a matter of general contract theory and as a normative matter
within contract law.
B. The Analytic Claim for a Paradigm Shift in Contract Theory
Relationalists contend that relational contracts are so prevalent in the real
world that the general theory of contract must acknowledge this practical
reality. That is, contract theory must be oriented in such a way as to put
relational contracts at its center. This can mean several things.
First, owing to the recognition that many contracts (some relationalists
would say most, if not all, contracts) are relational,14 relationalists argue that it
Financing, 64 Am. Soc. REV. 481 (1999) [hereinafter Uzzi, Financial Capital]; and Brian Uzzi, The Sources
and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61
AM. Soc. REv. 674 (1996) [hereinafter Uzzi, Sources and Consequences].
11 The best source on the implicit dimensions of contract broadly understood is IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF
CONTRACT: DISCRETE, RELATIONAL, AND NETWORK CONTRACTS (David Campbell et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT].
12 Stewart Macaulay, The Real and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of Relationships, Complexity and
the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT, supra note 11, at 51.
13 Even now, some contract theorists cannot resist challenging the empirical claim. See KIMEL, supra
note 7, at 81 n.50. In a recent article on relational contract theory, however, Kimel backs off the challenge to
the modest form of the empirical claim. See Kimel, supra note 3, at 234.
14 Some relationalists are committed to the view that exchange itself is deeply relational and that all
contractual intercourse is shaped in meaningful ways by relational features because contracts could not get off
the ground without sufficient social solidarity. Ironically, this view may be too moderate to be at the core of
relational contract theory. In short, once all contracts get folded into this form of relationalism, the claim is no
longer strong enough to warrant the disparate treatment of different forms of contracts, which seems central to
the normative thrust of relational contract theory. Indeed, non-relationalists do not bother opposing this form
of relationalism. Non-relationalists are only too happy to concede that all contracts should be treated under the
same rules: if all contracts are relational, all contracts are subject to the same law. Nevertheless, as the text
2010]
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would be useful to analyze contracts on some continuum or gradation from the
most discrete to the most relational. By utilizing this method of analysis, one
can differentiate more easily among types of contracts and apply the proper
policy approach based on the contractual context. Second, because relational
contracts are so common, relationalists argue that the general theory of
contracts needs to respect the nature of contracts in the real world and not
operate with a presumption that the law of contracts should be designed as a
law for strangers, where there is little background trust. Because relationalists
think that relational contracts are pervasive, they argue that orienting contract
law as a method to provide trust for discrete and formal transactions is
inappropriate. Rather, a new paradigm is needed to account for the degree to
which relational contracts and trust are central to the enterprise of contracting.
One can easily understand why relational contract theory's analytic move is
more controversial than its underlying empirical claim. Some relationalists
might think this analytical claim about reorienting contract theory follows from
the empirical claim, but that is not necessarily true. There is little controversy
surrounding the rather modest empirical claim that some contracts are deeply
relational. All that follows from this claim, perhaps, is that general contract
theory must make room for analyzing and respecting a class of relational
contracts. 15 But that hardly requires the sort of paradigm shift in theory and
law that one tends to associate with the urgings of hard-core relationalists. At
least part of the resistance to the analytical claim comes from the sense that the
empirical claim can easily be accommodated by slight modifications to
reigning contract theories. However, this resistance generally works, perhaps,
because non-relationalists simply do not accept the more aggressive empirical
claim that most contracts are meaningfully characterized by relational
properties and can be usefully analyzed based upon where they fall on the
discrete to relational continuum. 16
immediately following this note reveals, there is still room for differential treatment because of the possibility
of a continuum of relational factors.
15 For an analysis of how the empirical claim was absorbed into mainstream "neo-classical" contract law,
see generally Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 737 (2000). Some
of the ways the UCC can be read to absorb relationalism in laws governing performance, modification,
interpretation, and formation are discussed infra note 34.
16 In a recent clarification, Macneil changed terminology, hoping to get a "relational/as-if-discrete"
continuum off the ground to replace the relational-discrete continuum. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational
Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 877, 894-900 (2000) [hereinafter Macneil,
RCT: C & Q]. Macneil has always been fairly clear that "discreteness" is a "relative" property from the
perspective of a relational approach. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not
Know, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 483, 485; Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U. L.
[Vol. 59
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The analytic claim becomes more pressing if the empirical claim is
acknowledged to be more thoroughgoing. If relational contracts are very
pervasive (though the degree of pervasiveness to make the analytic claim
plausible is very hard specify), it becomes harder to embrace traditional
contract theory, which presumes contracts between strangers as its paradigm.
At least if one's meta-theoretical commitments require contract theories to
"fit" the underlying practice of contracting, it becomes hard not to orient one's
contract theory to match the reality of the social practice. Indeed, most
relationalists explicitly or implicitly embrace a stronger form of the empirical
claim than do non-relationalists.
The underlying empirical dispute is difficult to resolve, however. It is
virtually impossible to get a sense of what is happening in most contracts, and
it is very hard to say how pervasive a contract type needs to be to require
reorienting the theory of contract. These difficulties are at least part of the
reason we are unlikely to see much conciliation between the camps anytime
17soon.
Still, it should be noted that one can contest a strong form of the empirical
claim and nevertheless subscribe to a form of the analytic claim. One could
concede that true relational contracts are actually a rather small class of
contracts, all things considered, but that they are so normatively attractive in
their foregrounding of cooperation, collaboration, and solidarity that we should
REv. 340 (1983). However, Macneil's recent clarification demonstrates his ultimate commitment to the
"strongest" form of the empirical claim that all contracts are relational. The problem with this form of the
empirical claim, perhaps, is that it seems to dilute what is uniquely special about "relational contracts" since
many relationships forged by and underwriting long-term relational contracts are rather thin. See Kimel, supra
note 3, at 239 ("[T]he further we move towards [the empirical claim's] most extreme form-all contracts are
relational-the more it depends for its plausibility on an understanding of 'relationship' so watered-down as to
make the debate entirely uninteresting.").
Macneil has also quite recently tried to change his most basic terminology, calling his theory "essential
contract theory," rather than "relational contract theory." Macneil, RCT: C & Q, supra at 877, 881. That re-
branding has not been successful, and I prefer to stick with the old terminology and its thirty years of history
and development.
17 There is a useful cut at the empirical question in DiMaggio & Louch, supra note 10, at 620, 622. In
their close look at the 1996 General Social Survey economic sociology module, they find that "people buy and
sell goods and services from friends and kin" and that "substantial percentages of major transactions take
place between friends, relatives, or compound ties." Id. More specifically, "[a]lmost one-half of all used-car
purchases from individuals (46.0 percent) and home purchases where no agent is used (46.8 percent) are
transactions between relatives, friends, or acquaintances." Id. at 622-23. Approximately one-fourth of
purchases of legal services and home maintenance services are similarly within a social network. Id. at 623.
Does this evidence resolve the central empirical claim of relational contract theory? Of course not.
But it does at least help focus attention on contractual contexts where consumer transactions tend to involve
the use of strong social networks.
2010]
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want to model other contracts on that particularized, even if somewhat
atypical, form of contracting. 18  One could argue that modeling contracts on
deep relationships of collaboration and solidarity would better orient parties in
their transactions and could even maximize their surplus. 19  This is a way to
defend the core relationalist analytical claim without needing to prove the
empirical claim in any strong form.
The opposite is also true, however. One could concede the strong form of
the empirical claim and still resist the analytical claim on normative grounds.
One could say that preserving forms of "strangership" is essential to our
economy and society, and, accordingly, contracts should be modeled on
personal distance. If we design contracts and orient our contract theory as
something categorically different from our personal relationships which are
governed largely by moral and social norms, we are most likely to avoid the
juridification or contractualization of intimate personal relations. 21 Although
18 An example of this type of argument was once explained by Robert Gordon:
Some theorists have even advanced a bold hypothesis of a specific historical causal relationship
between the fantasy world of political-legal ideological discourse about contracts and the social
world of contracting: they contend that encouraging people to deal with one another as strangers
progressively erodes the underlying relations of solidarity, reciprocity and trust upon which
capitalist economies essentially depend.
Gordon, supra note 4, at 578-79; see also MARK VERNON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (2005) (arguing
that friendship and capitalism can sit in tension). Brian Uzzi asks: "What modem institutions
and ... arrangements need exist if embedded [i.e., relational] exchange systems are to arise and prosper in a
society?" Uzzi, Sources and Consequences, supra note 10, at 695. It may be that a more thoroughly relational
contract law could be the answer. Indeed, DiMaggio & Louch generally find a high degree of satisfaction in
embedded transactions, which is perhaps a reason for society to encourage them. DiMaggio & Louch, supra
note 10, at 633-34.
19 Daniel Markovits's contract theory of "contract as collaboration," for example, argues for orienting
contract theory along the dimension of collaboration. Daniel Markovits, Contracts and Collaboration, 113
YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). However, he is not really a relationalist because he seems to think that parties
generally come to contracts as strangers, id. at 1435, and that it is the contract itself that establishes the
cooperative relation between the parties, one that has no affective dimension, id. at 1432, 1451. Add to that
the fact that he explicitly claims distance from Ian Macneil (though the position he ascribes to Macneil and
rejects-that contracts are not "freestanding" sources of obligation-is not obviously one Macneil endorses).
Id. at 1450 n.68.
20 1 have explained the role of"strangership" in Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV.
631, 663-64 (2007), drawing upon two articles by Allan Silver. See Allan Silver, "Two Different Sorts of
Commerce" Friendship and Strangership in Civil Society, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND
PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY 43 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997); Allan
Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Modern Sociology, 95 AM.
J. Soc. 1474 (1990).
21 Forms of this argument against the analytic claim are actually quite common among non-relationalists.
See generally KIMEL, supra note 7 (arguing that contract facilitates detachment from personal relations);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 820 (2000)
[Vol. 59
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we lose something in the fit of the theory (if the strong empirical claim is, after
all, true), we gain some protection of the private sphere from the law, and that
is, arguably, normatively desirable.
22
One could also concede the empirical claim and still think that the
apparatus of relational contract theory is asking all the wrong questions since it
does not concern itself directly with wealth maximization or incentivizing
parties' behavior through default rules. 23  For that matter, neither does it
("This massive contractualization of human relationships [which is effected by relational contract theory]
undesirably obscures critical differences between economic and affective relationships, between explicit and
tacit reciprocity, between relationships that should be enforceable by both law and social norms and
relationships that should be enforceable only by social norms."); Kimel, supra note 3; Aditi Bagchi, Contract
v. Promise (Univ. Pa. Law Sch., Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-35, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1012150; see also Gunther Teubner, Expertise as Social Institution:
Internalising Third Parties into the Contract, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS OF CONTRACT, supra note 11, at 333,
343-46 (recognizing that relational contract theory risks contractualizing social life and arguing that would be
bad).
It is worth noting that this type of argument, if correct, goes a long way to address Seana Shiffrin's
recent concern about the "divergence" of contract norms from moral norms of promising. See Seana Valentine
Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REv. 708 (2007). If contracts are best
designed as something different than promises in "private" life, there is less reason to worry that there is norm
divergence. This argument is spelled out at length by Aditi Bagchi. See Bagchi, supra.
22 This argument is similar to the "crowding" thesis that because the law will tend to crowd out authentic
trust relations, we should be wary of interposing the law into trust relations. In its extreme form, the argument
counsels for no legal intervention where there is real trust between the parties. The merits of this argument are
addressed further infra Part IV. I discussed (and rejected) the "crowding" thesis in Ethan J. Leib, Friends as
Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REv. 665 (2009). See also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and Contract
Law, 47 AM. J. JuRIS. 25 (2002) (arguing against the thesis that legal enforceability degrades the social norm
of trust); Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1545 (2005) ("Whatever the intuitive appeal of
the claims that legalization undermines trust, they cannot be sustained once they are subjected to scrutiny and
empirical testing."); Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REv.
1717 (2006). Most generally, there is a real problem trying to separate neatly the spheres of contract and law
on the one hand and intimacy on the other. See generally VIVIANA A. ZELZER, THE PURCHASE OF INHMACY
(2005). This Article seeks to undermine the "separate spheres" story too.
23 This "asking the wrong questions" objection appears in Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some
Questions from Law and Economics, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 91 (1993). Craswell wants to orient contract
theory toward economic analysis to focus on consequences (of price and product safety) and sees relational
analysis as sociological and indifferent to consequences. Id. at 92, 98-99. It is not at all clear that this is a fair
description, as many relationalists are, after all, sensitive to such consequences. See, e.g., 1 STEWART
MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION 643-44 (2d ed. 2003); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract
and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 43, 55 (1993); Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the
Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV.
1051 (1966); Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy and Contracts of Adhesion, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 5 (1984).
Nevertheless, it is likely true as a general matter that the law and economics crowd prefers ex ante reasoning in
resolving contracts disputes, and the relationalist crowd tends to prefer ex post reasoning. See Speidel, supra
note 8, at 844.
Others in the law and economics tradition have acknowledged the pervasiveness of relational contracts
but have urged an orientation to contract theory guided by value maximization of the relationship between the
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concern itself primarily with wealth redistribution or welfare. 24 If those are a
contract theorist's desiderata, relational contract theory may not be especially
useful and those with other normative aspirations could reasonably reject this
as a paradigm.
But there is also another way of contesting the strong form of the empirical
claim while still arguing for a version of the analytical claim. It is plausible
that one could find orienting contract theory on the discrete-relational
continuum so useful as a way of distinguishing among types of contracts that
one could be relatively indifferent to how strong the empirical claim is and still
want to use the classificatory apparatus from relational contract theory.2 5
Some relationalists-Ian Macneil is exemplary on this score, delineating a
laundry list of dimensions of relationality (or "common contract norms") 26
have developed sophisticated ways of describing the relational features of
contracts and have helped create categories of analysis that divide the real
world of contract practice in a way that might prove analytically useful.
The trappings of relational contract theory may be useful for categorical
neatness, for theoretical integrity and exhaustiveness, or for more general
philosophical reasons (apart from "fit"). Since the apparatus of the theory can
accommodate promise-based liability, consent-based liability, reliance-based
liability, and relationship- or status-based liability, its very pluralism may be
attractive, especially to those who tire of seeking a fully coherent promissory
or reliance-based theory of contractual obligation. 27  Many other contract
parties so that they can produce the most surplus. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of
Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for
Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
24 See Hugh Collins, The Research Agenda of Implicit Dimensions of Contract, in IMPLICIT DIMENSIONS
OF CONTRACT, supra note 11, at 1, 22-23 (highlighting how difficult it is to see relationalists as having a
singular welfarist philosophy); James W. Fox, Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2003) (listing variants of the theory and their underlying political theories).
25 See generally Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need
for a "Rich Classificatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1018 (1981).
26 The list changes from time to time and is not intended to be exhaustive. The standard elements in
Macneil's most recent articulation are: "(1) role integrity (requiring consistency, involving internal conflict,
and being inherently complex); (2) reciprocity (the principle of getting something back for something given);
(3) implementation of planning; (4) effectuation of consent; (5) flexibility; (6) contractual solidarity; (7) the
restitution, reliance, and expectation interests (the 'linking norms'); (8) creation and restraint of power (the
'power norm'); (9) propriety of means, and (10) harmonization with the social matrix, that is, with
supracontract norms." Macneil, RCI: C & Q, supra note 16, at 879-80.
27 But see Kimel, supra note 3, at 252-53 (arguing that relational theory disables us from distinguishing
between different sources of obligation and helps us organize our priorities when they conflict in interesting
ways). Kimel's critique misses the mark. To say, as relationalists do, that promissory sources of obligation
and reliance sources of obligation all come within contract is not to say that we are always disabled from
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theorists use only a singular organizing principle to account for a social
practice that is rather heterogeneous, and the appeal of relational theory may be
its willingness to welcome multifarious sources of obligation and deep
fragmentation of the field of contract.28  Although, to be sure, Macneil's
complicated matrices probably scare away more contract theorists than they
invite into the fold, the approach of seeing contracts through their relational
dimensions has proven to be a rich method of dividing the often too-unified
world of contract theory. 29  Relational contract theorists can win over
adherents if contracts can be usefully mapped and ordered based on their
relational elements, even if only a small fraction of contracts are actually of a
"purely" relational type.
C. The Normative Claim About Contract Law
Whereas the first relationalist claim-the empirical one-is really
sociological and the second-the analytic one-is really meta-theoretical, the
third is a claim about what the law should be. There is plenty of controversy
about relational contract law, however. Consider Mel Eisenberg's summary of
the doctrinal suggestions that relationalists embrace:
(1) Rules that, in the case of relational contracts, would soften or
reverse the bite of the rigid offer-and-acceptance format of classical
contract law, and the corresponding intolerance of classical contract
law for indefiniteness, agreements to agree, and agreements to
negotiate in good faith. (2) Rules that would impose upon parties to a
relational contract a broad obligation to perform in good faith. (3)
Rules that would broaden the kinds of changed circumstances
(impossibility, impracticability, and frustration) that constitute an
excuse for nonperformance of a relational contract. (4) Rules that
would give content to particular kinds of contractual provisions that
may be found in relational contracts, such as best-efforts clauses or
unilateral rights to terminate at will. (5) Rules that would treat
relational contracts like partnerships, in the sense that such contracts
involve a mutual enterprise and should be construed in that light.
(6) Rules that would keep a relational contract together. (7) Rules
producing hierarchies of source of obligations to privilege in any given context. It is only to say that we
cannot-as Kimel and Bagchi do, for example-build a contract model with promise at its center, allowing
occasional "exceptions" for reliance-based liability. Relationalists think the practice is too capacious to be
organized around any singular principle of liability.
28 Relational contract theory's commitment to contextualization and fragmentation is explained in
Feinman, supra note 15.
29 For my assessment of how contract theory is too unified, see Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration,
Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 QumNPIAc L. REv. 1 (2005).
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that would impose upon parties to a relational contract a duty to
bargain in good faith to make equitable price adjustments when
changed circumstances occur, and would perhaps even impose upon
the advantaged party a duty to accept an equitable adjustment
proposed in good faith by the disadvantaged party. (8) Rules that
would permit the courts to adapt or revise the terms of ongoing
relational contracts in such a way that an unexpected loss that would
otherwise fall on one party will be shared by reducing the other
party's profits.30
We do not need to take each suggestion apart to get the gist: relationalists
respond to the reality and centrality of relational contracts by applying a set of
special doctrines that better resemble loose standards than formalistic rules.
Most importantly (and this is not reflected in Eisenberg's list of "doctrines"),
as Macneil has recently emphasized, the key relationalist move on the doctrinal
or legal front is to suggest that courts, when faced with disputing parties in
relational contracts, should seek to apply the intrinsic norms of the relationship
to settle the dispute, even if an application of classical contract law to the
parties' paper deal might call for a different outcome.31 Again, relationalists
emphasize the implicit dimension of contractual undertakings and the
unfolding nature of the contractual relationship, which develops and is
modified over time even if the paper deal does not reflect such developments.32
Relationalists instruct judges to bring social norms to bear upon disputing
parties since the social norms are the real scaffolding for the parties'
relationship and must be given respect and effect to support relational
contracting properly. This does not, however, mean that relationalists reject
the application of all external norms; applying legal norms is always, in part,
30 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 817-18 (citing David Campbell & Donald Harris, Flexibility in Long-
Term Contractual Relationships: The Role of Co-Operation, 20 J.L. & Soc'Y 166 (1993)); Robert A. Hillman,
Contract Excuse and Bankruptcy Discharge, 43 STAN. L. REv. 99, 132-33 (1990); Robert A. Hillman, Court
Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DuKE L.J. 1; Ian. R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. R~v. 854 (1978); Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under
Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 369 (1981)); see also Richard E. Speidel, Article 2 and
Relational Contracts, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 789 (1993) [hereinafter Speidel, Article 2 and Relational
Contracts]; Speidel, supra note 8.
31 See Macneil, RCT: C & Q, supra note 16, at 900; see also Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Contracts,
supra note 30, at 793 (arguing that relational contract theory's normative dimension involves internalizing
parties' social norms).
32 See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 25, at 1041.
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the application of external norms. Relationalists merely require heightened
sensitivity to calibration with internal norms as well.
33
In relational theory's most modest form, its adherents urge incorporating
trade usages, courses of dealing, courses of performance, and a general good
faith obligation. But this urging has largely already been adopted by modem
contract law through the Uniform Commercial Code-another way we are all
relationalists now.34 The common law also already embraces many of these
minimalist relationalist prescriptions. True devotees of relational contract
theory, however, believe that these modest incorporation strategies do not go
far enough. The relational contract theory camp recommends a much more
substantial effort to mine parties' relationships for implicit understandings and
social norms and to analyze their relational properties to help resolve disputes.
These implicit understandings can play a role in adjudicating questions of
formation, performance, modification, interpretation, or remedies.
The set of normative claims that relationalists offer about their preferred
approach to contract law has met substantial opposition. It can be very
difficult to envision how to operationalize a special set of judicial principles to
govern relational contracts without, as a threshold matter, having an
operationalized definition of the relational contract. Non-relationalists argue
that it is difficult to pin down with any degree of clarity which contracts should
33 I thank Jay Feinman for reminding me about this important dimension of relational contract theory that
is often under-emphasized.
34 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra note 12, at 59; Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Contracts, supra note 30.
Courses of performance, courses of dealing, and usages of trade are incorporated by, inter alia, U.C.C. § 1-
102(2)(b) (1977) (establishing an "underlying purpose[] and polic[y]" of the UCC to be "the continued
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties"); id. § 1-201(3)
(defining "agreement" to include these); id. § 1-205 (defining "course of dealing" and "usage of trade"); id
§ 2-202 (allowing terms of agreements to be supplemented and explained by these); id. § 2-208 (allowing
courts to consider these in determining the meaning of an agreement); and id. § 2-302(2) (allowing courts to
consider evidence of "commercial setting" in assessing unconscionability). Commercial reasonability more
generally pervades the code as a benchmark for proper behavior and is one of the code's core gap-fillers. E.g.,
id. §§ 2-305, 2-309, 2-311, 2-503, 2-504, 2-602, 2-610, 2-704, 2-706, 2-709, 2-714, 2-715, 2-716, 2-718.
Moreover, the UCC's recognition of largely indefinite and vague agreements is a move in the relationalist
direction. See id. §§ 2-204, 2-206 (relaxing the offer and acceptance and definiteness requirements of the
common law); id. §§ 2-305, 2-306, 2-716 cmt. 2 (recognizing requirements, outputs, and open-price contracts,
which might have been too vague to be enforceable under classical contract law or might have lacked
consideration under classical rules). Perhaps the single largest relationalist incorporation into the code occurs
in U.C.C. § 1-201(3): an agreement may be found solely "by implication," a method of contract formation
from which most formalists would recoil. Moreover, Macneil neatly demonstrates how § 2-207's abrogation
of the strict mirror-image rule for acceptance and its embrace of formation through conduct in the case of the
"battle-of-the-forms" is a partial incorporation of elements of relational contract theory. See MACNEIL, supra
note 4, at 72-75.
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count as relational ones. According to Eisenberg, "it is impossible to
locate.., a definition that adequately distinguishes relational and nonrelational
contracts in a legally operational way-that is, in a way that carves out a set of
special and well-specified relational contracts for treatment under a body of
special and well-specified rules. 35 Although duration is often the test used as
a shortcut by relationalists, it is clearly an insufficient one. Some short-term
transactions trigger substantial interdependence, and some long-term
transactions still remain "discrete" and controlled primarily by legal documents
and formalities. Once the test for what counts as a relational contract becomes
so diluted as to encompass every contract (because every contract establishes
some relationship), there is not, as Eisenberg has argued, much room for a
special relational contract law.
36
But Eisenberg's critique of relational contract theory, 37 a sorites argument
of sorts,38 misses its mark in several ways. First, it is only one brand of the
normative claim that seeks special treatment for a small class of relational
contracts; more thoroughgoing relationalists might very well concede that a
special set of standards that would only apply to "relational contracts" is not
needed. These relationalists would have contract law develop a generalized
law to apply to all or most contracts, in light of their relational nature. Thus,
Eisenberg's concern about the need for an operationalized legal definition of
35 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 813.
36 Id. at 818 ("Because there is no significant distinction between contracts as a class and relational
contracts, these rules, and others like them, can be separated into two broad classes: those that are good for all
contracts and therefore should be general principles of contract law, and those that are not good for any
contracts."); see also id. at 817 ("There can be no special law of relational contracts, because relational
contracts and contracts are virtually one and the same.").
37 Eisenberg's critique is generally embraced by opponents of relational contract theory. See, e.g., Ira
Mark Ellman, "Contract Thinking" Was Marvin's Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1365, 1369 (2001);
Kimel, supra note 3, at 235-36.
38 The sorites paradox was a rhetorical strategy used by the ancient Skeptics against the Stoics to prove
that their confidence in the possibility of knowledge was unfounded. The argument proceeds by trying to
prove that although one thinks that one knows what a "heap" is, it turns out that there are no heaps. (Sorites
means heap in Greek.) One might think 10,000 grains of sand make a heap. Yet, since (1) one grain of sand is
no heap and (2) for every n grains of sand that are not heaps, n+1 grains of sand will also not be a heap, there
are no heaps. For more on the sorites, see Ethan J. Leib, On the Sorites: Toward a Better Understanding of
Chrysippus, 21 ANCIENT PHIL. 147 (2001). The sorites argument probably fails because proposition (2) is
false. Just because a person may have some difficulty in figuring out where to draw the line between a few
grains of sand and a heap does not mean we cannot distinguish the concepts at the extremes. Fuzziness of
categories does not mean that they cannot be used, even when it comes to the law.
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the relational contract may not be necessary after all, if all contracts should be
treated as relational.39
Alternatively, if we take Macneil's most recent suggestion for the content
of relational contract law-to apply internal relational norms to contractual
disputes, whatever the relationship and whatever the contract-no complicated
work needs to be done to separate the world into relational and non-relational
contracts. Rather, to the extent there are any relational norms, the law should
remain sensitive to them. That may not be an easy task, but it does not
implicate Eisenberg's concern about differentiating relational and non-
relational contracts.
More importantly, perhaps, Eisenberg fails to prove that there is no way to
operationalize a law of relational contracts. Although he seems to think a"spectrum approach" of seeing contracts along a spectrum from the discrete to
the relational is "acceptable . . . from a sociological and economic
perspective, 40 he concludes that a spectrum cannot be used within contract
law because "many or most contracts will have both relational and discrete
elements" and because "[r]ules whose applicability depended on where a
contract is located in a spectrum-that is, on how many relational indicia the
contract has and of what kind-would be rules in name only."41 Yet this entire
argument hinges on a substantive view about the desirability of rules over
39 And even if a relational contract law would apply only to a smaller class of contracts, a multi-factor
test proposed by Speidel (drawing from Lewis Kornauser's summary of Macneil's work) is as coherent as any
and raises questions about Eisenberg's general belief in the uselessness of trying to define relational contracts:
The degree to which a contract is relational depends upon the presence of some or all of the
characteristics discussed below. Most notable are whether "(1) the transaction extends over time,
(2) parts of the exchange cannot be measured or specified precisely [at the time of contracting],
and (3) the interdependence of the parties to the exchange extends at any given moment beyond
any single discrete transaction to a range of social interrelationships."
Speidel, Article 2 and Relational Contracts, supra note 30, at 792 (quoting Lewis A. Komhauser, The
Resurrection of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. Rnv. 184, 190 (1982)). Undoubtedly, there are difficulties in
classification at the margin, but fuzziness of a concept's boundaries does not mean that no meaningful
distinctions can be drawn in clear cases. See supra note 38.
40 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 814. Eisenberg seems to contest the centrality of the spectrum approach
to Macneil's relational contract theory. Id. at 813 ("Macneil sometimes treats discreteness as an end of a
spectrum rather than as a definition of a body of contracts."). However, it really is difficult to read Macneil as
ever suggesting anything other than a spectrum approach. To be fair, others (like Speidel and Hillman, for
example) have tried to treat "relational contracts" as a reasonably distinct category the law could identify and
treat specially and differently. In what follows, when I discuss "relational contracts," I mean "relatively
relational contracts" and embrace Macneil's spectrum approach, which I do not think fails Eisenberg's
challenge.
41 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 814.
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standards, something relationalists tend to contest as part of their normative
claim. Indeed, Eisenberg offers no proof that standards are not capable of
being legally operationalized; he simply states that it would be hard to develop
clear rules using a spectrum approach, betraying his preference for rules over
standards.
Macneil has always challenged us to see that in dispute resolution certain
types of contract mixtures (between discrete and relational properties) will
counsel for giving greater effect to the formal planning of the parties and their
manifestations of consent, while other types of mixtures will counsel for more
flexibility and solidarity enhancement. 42 Although it is not easy to figure out
which norms to foreground and when, relationalists try to imbue
decisionmakers with this sensitivity. That a multi-factor set of inquiries is
involved does not render the inquiry less law-like than clear formal rules,
though it is also clear why "rule of law" arguments are routinely invoked
against relational contract theory's doctrinal and normative prescriptions,
which sound in standards over rules.43
To be sure, one may want clear legal rules for all sorts of reasons and
decide to reject relational contract theory because its approach relies too
heavily on standards. Indeed, Macneil has already admitted that good
practitioners of relational contract analysis would have to become
"anthropologists, sociologists, economists, political theorists, and
philosophers." 44 This is a tall order, indeed. Yet Eisenberg's dispute is
ultimately about the merits, not an explanation for the impossibility of a
relational contract law. It is debatable whether it is wise to instruct judges to
apply the intrinsic norms between parties to a contract dispute and whether a
judge could ever carry out these instructions well in light of evidentiary
difficulties. But we could not really say that such an instruction is not capable
of being legally operationalized. 45 One can choose to be a non-relationalist
because one likes rules over standards. Nevertheless, preferring rules over
42 See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 4, at 17.
43 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 8, at 1191.
44 MACNEIL, supra note 4, at 70.
45 But see Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual
Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 236 (1979) ("Serious problems of recognition and application are posed by
such a rich classificatory apparatus."). Macneil replies: "A 'rich classificatory apparatus' of some kind is
essential if contractual relations are to be both understood and subjected to successful, realistic, and reasonably
consistent analysis." Macneil, supra note 25, at 1025 n.26 (quoting Williamson, supra).
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standards does not tell us, in the words of Eisenberg's title, "why there is no
law of relational contracts." 4
6
There are two related substantive objections to directing judges, in
accordance with relational contract theory, to apply relational norms to
contractual disputes. One is an argument deriving from the path-breaking
work of Lisa Bernstein, which tends to show that the law cannot easily
incorporate trade usages and customs because few actually exist and few are
47generally observed. This skepticism that the law can discover internal norms
within relational contracts is quite relevant for relational contract theory. If
relationalists are committed to the normative claim that the law should
incorporate and seek internal norms between parties, evidence that tends to
show that these norms are rarely mutually understood between parties and
rarely embraced by parties surely complicates the viability of the relationalists'
fundamental normative prescription.
Still, there is reason to believe that Bernstein's work can be read more as a
cautionary note about evidence than as decisive proof against relational
contract theory as such. In short, Bernstein's empirical studies are obviously
limited to a few areas of inquiry. And although they are fascinating windows
into certain trade communities, it hardly follows that there are no immanent
business norms that exist, that can be discovered, that are generally followed,
and that can be enforced by courts.48 Some have taken Bernstein's empirical
findings to support the rejection of any incorporation strategy, whether of the
UCC or of the relationalists more generally. Yet that seems an unnecessary
jump to a conclusion about the viability and desirability of incorporation, and it
certainly is not required by the available evidence. In any case, another
plausible response to Bernstein's findings, offered by Macneil himself, is to
find ways to get courts to send relational disputes to mediation, arbitration, or
46 Eisenberg, supra note 21.
47 See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2 's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Cm. L. REv. 710 (1999);
Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1765 (1996). For a related critique about courts' inability to incorporate norms
with any degree of uniformity, see Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTLAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
48 This line of defense is on display in Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of
Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 775, 784-804
(2000). Macaulay also analyzes Scott's related critique. Macaulay, supra note 12, at 59-68.
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agency management since these institutions are likely more capable than courts
of discovering such norms, if and when they exist.
49
A related concern that underwrites the argument against the normative
claim stems from what Eric Posner calls the possibility and likelihood of"radical judicial error., 50 The worry here is slightly different from Bernstein's.
Whereas she emphasizes that there may be no immanent norms between
parties, Posner emphasizes that even if there were such norms, judges would
not be competent to discern or apply them. Posner is quite clear that this
assumption of radical judicial incompetence is just an assumption,51 though he
offers a bit of empirical evidence to prove the incompetence of judges in at
52least one area, consumer credit contracts. The gist of his argument is that
judges are going to resolve disputes essentially at random if they are stuck
trying to figure out parties' internal norms. However, judges are capable of
engaging in formalistic decision-making, and they should stick to that task
within their competence. 53  Posner's argument-and arguments regarding
judicial incompetence more generally-underwrites a formalistic approach to
contract law, which sits in substantial tension with relationalists' normative
claim about how contract law should be administered. To be sure, formalism
may be attractive for other reasons. Perhaps non-relational norms in contract
law support the underlying relationships best, and judicializing relational
norms may "destroy the very informality that makes them so effective in the
first instance., 54 However, judicial incompetence seems to be central to the
non-relationalist view that implicit social norms ought not govern contractual
disputes in court.
This is clearly not the place to attempt to settle the age-old debates between
formalists and non-formalists. But a few observations seem appropriate in
light of the recent effort to rejuvenate formalism in response to the relationalist
challenge. First, the assumption of radical judicial error is quite difficult to
49 Macneil, RCE" C & Q, supra note 16, at 906.
50 See generally Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error,
94 Nw. U. L. REv. 749 (2000).
51 Id. at 754. Although Scott abjures from signing on to the radical judicial error hypothesis, concerns
about judicial competence certainly animate his argument for formalism as well. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 8,
at 858-59, 861.
52 See Jeffrey E. Allen & Robert J. Staaf, The Nexus Between Usury, "Time Price" and
Unconscionability in Installment Sales, 14 UCC L.J. 219 (1982).
53 There are many nuances to Posner's view, but to discuss them all is beyond the scope of this Article.
54 Scott, supra note 8, at 852.
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swallow. 55 Admittedly, the empirical evidence available to settle the question
of the error-prone nature of judicial decision-making is remarkably thin. Yet it
would seem like the claim that judges would do no better than a random coin
toss when it comes to using their common sense to understand the underlying
deals in contractual contexts should bear the burden of proof.56 Posner has not
met that burden yet, so presuming that properly instructed judges can get it
right much of the time (or at least on average better than random) is probably
not outlandish. Indeed, even if radical judicial error is possible in a particular
class of cases, those are the cases in which formalism might be appropriate.
Relational norms can still be applied in other cases where the parties'
57intentions can be made relatively clear through context and common sense.
Second, if judges are, in fact, so incompetent at divining business deals,
there would be reason to suspect they would be similarly incompetent at
applying the rigors of formalism. After all, formalism's contributions to
contract law-consideration, the statute of frauds, the parol evidence rule, the
plain meaning rule, offer-and-acceptance principles, and indefiniteness rules-
are hardly uniformly applied and can be unpredictable for parties and lawyers
alike. Maybe it is somewhat easier to enforce a paper deal than it is to enforce
a real deal, which is hard to discover, especially when parties have incentives
to lie once the relationship breaks down.58 However, it is still altogether
plausible that judges would not be very good at formalism either. They prize
55 Even Posner seems to acknowledge that if "courts can determine the parties' intentions from context
and common sense .... then courts should ignore form." PosNER, supra note 5, at 162. That concession also
raises the possibility of a perfectly acceptable third way that might appeal to some formalists and some
relationalists alike: when courts can determine parties' intentions from context and common sense, they ought
to gap-fill accordingly; when they cannot, they should endeavor to be formalistic. For his part, Macaulay
would accept a different third way: he would allow courts to be formalistic only when both parties had
competent counsel and clearly were able to bargain meaningfully with one another (rather than through
battling of standardized forms). See Macaulay, supra note 12, at 62 (citing Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Presto
Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)). Campbell and Collins also develop a nuanced third way of
deciding when the implicit dimensions of a contract should control in court. David Campbell & Hugh Collins,
Discovering the Implicit Dimensions of Contract, in IMPLICIT DIENSIONS OF CONTRACT, supra note 11, at 25,
42.
56 To be sure, others in law and economics have not made such radical assumptions about judicial
incompetence. See Gillian Hadfield, Judicial Competence and the Interpretation of Incomplete Contracts, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 159 (1994).
57 See supra note 55. Of course, if courts or parties don't know when judges are likely to err, it is hard to
create a two-track model along the lines suggested. There is also a real cost associated with attempting to
learn about party norms and expectations-that cannot be discounted fully, though the cost itself (in judicial
time and energy) is not particularly easy to measure.
58 Posner has emphasized that the fact-finding processes in judicial adjudications do not inspire
confidence and can lead to many judicial errors. POSNER, supra note 5, at 153.
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their discretion and are not any better at applying potentially undesirable
acontextual rules than they are at discerning the understanding of the parties
based on the context.59  If they are not very good at formalism, formalism is
not a great alternative to the complexity of discovering relational norms.60
Consider Judge Richard Posner on the matter:
There has never been a time when the courts of the United States,
state or federal, behaved consistently in accordance with [legal
formalism]. Nor could they, for reasons rooted in the nature of law
and legal institutions, in the limitations of human knowledge, and in
the character of a political system. 61
Third, formalism's premise that parties will be properly chastened and put
all they want in their paper deals anticipating the response of formalistic courts
is not obviously viable. It is ultimately an empirical question whether a
judicial strategy of formalism can actually succeed in getting parties to put all
their important matters into formal arrangements, since the choice to use
formalities is a complex one. Parties choose not to use formalities for many
reasons. 62 For example, contracting with forms is very costly, and since few
contracts actually result in legal disputes, it is a cost that is often not worth
incurring because of the low risk of contractual failure. Moreover, in many
cases, a long-term relationship will be presumed to require accommodation
over time that cannot easily be anticipated at some moment of formal
execution. Finally, in the case of many contracts, the relationship is premised
on social and interpersonal ties (even though the parties would want legal
sanctions if the relationship ends). Being formalistic about the paper deal up
front will lead parties not to cooperate at all, costing both parties the surplus
they otherwise could have achieved from the relationship as long as it lasts.63
Given that these factors contribute to the sort of incomplete and gap-ridden
59 See Macaulay, supra note 12, at 62, 77 (drawing upon "realism" to reject the possibility of formalism).
60 Posner insists that although judges are incompetent at discovering and applying internal relational
norms, they are perfectly capable of deciding whether parties have an intention to have legally available
remedies in the first place. POSNEi, supra note 5, at 156; Posner, supra note 50, at 762-63, 767. This central
distinction is necessary to make the argument work. But it preys on the ability of courts to stick with
formalism, since Posner thinks judges can competently make these determinations through the use of formal
reasoning. I am somewhat less optimistic since like most relationalists, I am a realist too-I think judges use
play in the joints to manipulate formal categories. If that is correct, there will be-and must be to make his
argument work-a fair bit of judicial "error" on the very threshold question about which Posner thinks judges
are competent.
61 Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 23.
62 See generally Chamy, supra note 9 (discussing the role of non-legal sanctions in the formation of non-
formalized agreements).
63 See Ingram & Zou, supra note 10, at 170.
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contracts we see in relational contracting, formalism might actually serve not
to chasten parties at all but only to prevent these forms of cooperation
altogether. 64  Relational contractors are already the ones most immune to
formal planning, so it is an odd fit to insist on formalism in these contractual
contexts.65
Alternatively, formalism might succeed in part, but then the parties risk
getting stuck in their formalities and thus will be unable to rely on the
flexibility and good faith that make relational contracts so successful in the
first place. Legal norms, when they are formalistically applied, risk eroding
the underlying relationship, which does so much of the work keeping parties in
line.
Let me elaborate on the last point. It is common to see arguments along the
following lines: "[I]n ongoing intimate relationships, legal mechanisms are
imperialistic and do not function effectively in concert with extralegal forces"
66or social norms internal to a relationship. However, this is not a necessary
conclusion. Indeed, the very same authors who endorse this thesis (one of
whom is now clearly a formalist) also concede that "legal enforcement of
long-term commitments is a particularly valuable method of bolstering
extralegal norms." 68 Presumably, they view legal enforcement as particularly
useful for bolstering social norms when they are weak and as imperialistic
64 There is, it should be noted, some empirical evidence that some relational contracts actually become
more detailed over time. See Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance
Function as Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707 (2002); Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle
C. Sampson, Do Prior Alliances Influence Alliance Contract Structure?, in STRATEGIC ALLIANCES:
GOVERNANCE AND CONTRACTS 206 (Africa Arino & Jeffrey J. Reuer eds., 2006); Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle
C. Sampson, Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from
Technology Development Projects, 55 MGMT. Sci. 906 (2009). Although this finding seems to stand in some
tension with the idea that relational governance relies on loose and open-ended contract terms, it makes some
sense too. As the relationship deepens, one can more easily get more specific about the nature of the
relationship, which needed to remain more incomplete in its infancy. Macneil suggests as much in his work on
relational contract theory. See Macneil, supra note 25, at 1041 (explaining that contract choice "is thus an
incremental process in which parties gather increasing information and gradually agree to more and more as
they proceed"). The same is probably true in friendships. As time goes on, we certainly get clearer about our
expectations and responsibilities within the relationship.
65 Relationalists may very well embrace formalism for relatively discrete contracts, since the norms of
planning and consent are considered especially important by relational contract theory in relatively discrete
contracts. See Macneil, RCT C & Q, supra note 16, at 879-80.
66 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1295. I revisit this debate infra Part IV.
67 See Scott, supra note 8.
68 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1330. See also POSNER, supra note 5, at 8 ("[M]any legal rules are best
understood as efforts to harness the independent regulatory power of social norms."). But see id at 64
("[J]udicial enforcement would interfere with trust relationships.").
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when social norms are particularly strong. Although these scholars are to be
commended for providing nuance to a generally oversimplified analysis of the
interaction between social and legal norms, I suggest that the manner of
enforcing legal norms also will likely effect how legal and social norms will
interact. My suggestion is that formalism with respect to legal norms is likely
to prove more imperialistic and will have a greater likelihood of displacing and
interfering with social norms. This is a play on Scott's argument for
formalism-that judicializing social norms will destroy what makes relational
contracts so effective. To the contrary, forcing parties to get formalistic and
enforcing their commitments in formalistic ways risks accomplishing that very
same result.
There is a related argument against formalism from within relational
contract theory. Relationalists' normative claims are underwritten in some
measure by an orientation toward using contract law to support "organic
solidarity." This means that the law must be made resonant with our affinities
and symbolize to us our general sense of obligations or risk illegitimacy. 69 It is
an empirical question (though, again, one quite difficult to test) whether
formalism interferes with the ultimate legitimacy of contract law and whether
members of society will feel that a formalistic approach to contract does not
resonate with their aspirations as relational contractors. But relationalists
argue that we are more likely to achieve contractual justice, however defined,
and contractual legitimacy by tailoring contract law's application in light of
real relationships between parties, not fictitious and incomplete ones on paper.
Of course, formalists understand that there are real costs associated with
formalism, 7° but relationalists see those costs as so deeply undermining
contract law's purpose and legitimacy that they cannot stomach it. 71  More
practically, although formalists emphasize all the gains in predictability and
"rule of law" that might result from a commitment to enforcing only clear
69 Collins, supra note 24, at 1, 16; Macaulay, supra note 48, at 777-96. See generally Macaulay, supra
note 12. The "resonance" idea might be said to find some support in scholarship that traces the relationship
between compliance and the perceived substantive fairness of legal institutions. See generally Janice Nadler,
Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1399 (2005) (arguing that harmonizing law and social norms can help to
breed compliance, and the opposite can breed noncompliance); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453 (1997). Organic solidarity is also described (with a somewhat
different focus) in Gordon, supra note 4, at 569-70.
70 E.g., Scott, supra note 8, at 861.
71 See Collins, supra note 24, at 1, 8 ("[A] process of legal recognition of implicit [and relational]
dimensions [of contract] is necessary and inevitable in any system of law."); Macneil, supra note 16, at 508
("[P]romise-centered theories [are] inadequate to deal with complex contractual relations without distortion
and omission.").
[Vol. 59
HeinOnline  -- 59 Emory L.J. 672 2009-2010
CONTRACTS AND FRIENDSHIPS
paper deals that are bargained-for promises, relationalists (that is, relationalists
who concede this premise) focus on a different kind of "calculability": the
72predictability for the parties' themselves rather than for their lawyers. The
capitalist system-if that is one's point of departure for designing a contract-
can work better, they might argue, if parties can bank on their real deals, not
idiosyncratic paper deals drawn up by their adversarial lawyers with little
sensitivity to the underlying relationship between the parties.73
I do not expect to resolve all of these central debates of contract theory
here. I only hope to give a flavor of the status of the current debate. The
argument that follows supports the relational theory of contract by highlighting
how relational contracts are like friendships (Parts II and III) and employs that
analogy to illuminate some ongoing debates within contract law and theory
(Part IV).
II. FRIENDSH[P AS RELATIONAL CONTRACT
To argue that friendships can be illuminated by relational contract theory is
not to argue that the entirety of the social institution of friendship can be
understood in contractualized terms. That is, it is so obvious that friendship is
something more than a "mere" contract, even a relational one, that the
argumentative endeavor here might be viewed as a category mistake. 74 Still,
with the appropriate caveats in place (and I shall put some more in place after
the affirmative case is made for thinking of friendship as a relational contract),
this can be an illuminating window into the interpersonal relationship of
friendship.
72 Some relationalists would just parry this argument with realism and say there is good reason to be
skeptical about judges' capacities to adhere to truly formalistic reasoning.
73 See Collins, supra note 24, at 10.
74 For my "rich classificatory apparatus" about how to define the friend, see Leib, supra note 20, at 638-
53; and Ethan J. Leib, Friends and the Law: Can Public Policy Support the Institution of Friendship?, 145
POL'Y REv. 55 (2007). I also use a particular emphasis in defining friendship in Leib, supra note 22, but limit
the analysis there to very close friends. It is fair to say that the working concept of friendship in what follows
is a broader category than the one I have utilized in previous work (though not as broad as the type of
friendship I explore in Ethan J. Leib, The Politics of Family and Friends in Aristotle and Montaigne, 31
INTERPRETATION: J. POL. PHIL. 165 (2004)). 1 am not the first, of course, to see the fiduciary relationship as a
special case of the relational contract. See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1126-28; Scott & Scott,
supra note 6, at 1265-66.
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A. Friendship's Similarity to Relational Contracts
Friendships and relational contracts have several basic structural features in
common. In both types of relationships, there is an understanding that parties
contemplate a "long-term commitment to pursue shared goals, the fulfillment
of which will enhance the joint welfare of the parties. 7 5 Although parties are
never fully expected to engage in complete selflessness in fulfilling their
mutual commitment to one another in either friendships or relational contracts,
they are generally supposed to be taking their partners' interests as independent
76reasons for action.
In pursuing their relationships in the cases of both friendships and
relational contracts, parties will often furnish gifts and favors to one another,77
and the nature of the gift-giving is rarely a matter of pure altruism. 78 These
75 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1229, 1255. It is, of course, true that the "term" and intensity can vary
greatly. Short-term friends frequently pursue friendship during, say, summer camp or military training.
However, so long as there is some duration and a predicted future, such relationships can qualify as real
friendships for the purposes of the comparison.
76 For a description of friendship that coheres with this conception, see Jeanette Kennett & Steve
Matthews, What's the Buzz? Undercover Marketing and the Corruption of Friendship, 25 J. APPLIED PHIL. 2,
8 (2008) ("My reasons for action where [my friend] is concerned do not depend on any contingent similarity of
interests, and neither are they derivative of other personal or professional commitments. In the case where my
close friend's interests diverge from mine her interests continue to have active guiding force for me, since in
close friendship it is her interests as such that are important, not her interests as filtered though my assessment
of my own profit or amusement.").
77 See Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names, and Religion, 12 J.
LEGAL STUD. 135, 156 (1983); Janet T. Landa, The Enigma of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive
Law and Order, 3 INT'L REv. L. & ECoN. 137, 152-56 (1983); Ian R. Macneil, Exchange Revisited: Individual
Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 568 (1986). Those in relational contracts display just this need to
distance themselves from "mere" commercial interaction. See, e.g., Uzzi, Sources and Consequences, supra
note 10, at 680 (providing evidence of how gifting works within relational exchange). Indeed, there is
evidence that gifts can be valued differentially, depending on whether the recipient thinks the gift is based on
affect, role, or cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ames et al., It's the Thought That Counts: On
Perceiving How Helpers Decide to Lend a Hand, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461 (2004).
78 See Wightman, supra note 4, at 120 (arguing that although gift-giving can be associated with altruism,
it is more generally reciprocal within interpersonal relationships and relational contracts, and its reciprocity
complicates the story of altruism); see also MARCEL MAUSS, TIHE GIFT (W.D. Halls trans., Routledge 2005)
(1954) (exposing the gift as a form of exchange); POSNER, supra note 5, at 50, 55-56 (arguing that gift-giving
is rarely deeply altruistic); Eric A. Posner, Altruism, Status, and Trust in the Law of Gifts and Gratuitous
Promises, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 567. To be fair, in some contractual settings, gifts are refused, precisely to avoid
muddying the waters in a commercial exchange. See, e.g., Jordan I. Siegel et al., Egalitarianism, Cultural
Distance, and FDI: A New Approach 8 (Am. Law & Econ. Ass'n Annual Meetings, Working Paper No. 133,
2008), available at http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=2268&context-alea. Siegel and co-
authors quote from a form letter that a "prospective customer or partner" could expect to receive if he or she
gave a gift to a Motorola employee in Korea:
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reciprocated gifts and favors signal commitment and consideration of one
another's interests over and above the commitment and consideration that
result from "mere" commercial exchange in one-shot discrete transactions.
There is a deliberate effort in both types of relationships to show especial
partiality.7 9
The requirements for behavior in either relationship are rarely well-
specified; we enter these relationships without fully knowing what we shall be
called upon to do. 80  There is also a high degree of interdependence between
the parties, both relationships are complex, and both require a set of rather
varied duties. Uncertainty about our basic responsibilities is constitutive of the
relationships, and they rely heavily on implicit and tacit understandings. 81
When one does have to specify particular conduct, parties tend to do so in
very general, broad, or vague terms.8 2  Most often, parties simply cannot
allocate risks of their mutual endeavor at the start of a relationship because so
I hereby wish to thank you for your kindness in sending a gift. While I know that your intentions
were positive, in order to avoid even the appearance of anything but a business relationship built
on the business value offered by our respective organizations, Motorola's Code of Business
Conduct requires that we not accept gifts from our business partners, other than low cost
promotional items. Therefore, I am respectfully returning your gift. I would like to take this
opportunity to emphasize that it is really unnecessary to send gifts and thank you once again for
your gesture of friendship.
Id. This is a fascinating but quite unusual business practice. As Siegel and co-authors concede, this unusual
strategy forces Motorola Korea to lose business, since it is "de rigueur" within Korea to accept and give such
gifts. Id. at 8.
79 There is a large philosophical literature discussing the partiality that is constitutive of friendship. See
generally LAWRENCE A. BLUM, FRIENDSHP, ALTRUISM, AND MORALITY (1980); MARILYN FRIEDMAN, WHAT
ARE FRIENDS FOR? 192 (1993); TROY A. JOLLIMORE, FRIENDSHIP AND AGENT-RELATIVE MORALITY (2001);
David B. Annis, The Meaning, Value, and Duties of Friendship, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 349 (1987); Neera Badhwar
Kapur, Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship, 101 ETHICs 483
(1991); Marcia Baron, Impartiality and Friendship, 101 ETHICS 836 (1991); Dean Cocking & Justin Oakley,
Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of Alienation, 106 EImcs 86 (1995); John
Cottingham, Partiality, Favouritism and Morality, 36 PHIL. Q. 357 (1986); Neera Kapur Badhwar, Friends as
Ends in Themselves, 48 PHIL. & PHENOMOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1987); Peter Railton, Alienation,
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 93, 98-99 (Samuel
Scheffler ed., 1988); William H. Wilcox, Egoists, Consequentialists, and Their Friends, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
73 (1987); Susan Wolf, Morality and Partiality, 6 PHIL. PERSPECTIVES 243 (1992). But see SHELLY KAGAN,
THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 367 (1989) (denying that love and friendship require favoritism).
80 Macaulay, supra note 12, at 78 n.65.
81 One other legal scholar has pursued the morphological similarity between friendship and at least one
type of relational contract: the employer-employee relationship. See Gary Chartier, Friendship, Identity, and
Solidarity. An Approach to Rights in Plant Closing Cases, 16 RATIO JuIS 324 (2003) (focusing upon the
implicit understandings in each type of relationship).
82 Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1092-93.
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much is uncertain, and so much trust-building is necessary to get the
relationship off the ground.83  Indeed, the very incompleteness of the deal
between the parties is central in defining what counts as a relational contract,
84
and friendship shares this incompleteness in the specification of parties' rights
and duties.
Yet there are some general principles of conduct that can be presumed in
both types of relationships. First, there is an assumption that parties will
behave in "good faith" throughout the often uncertain term of the relationship
(or risk destroying the relationship). Second, both parties in both relationships
will expect "best efforts" in producing joint value from the relationship. And
finally, both parties in both relationships will expect parties to adjust their
assumed responsibilities reasonably if underlying circumstances change.86  In
sum, both relational contracts and friendships display high degrees of trust,
interdependence, flexibility, reciprocity, and solidarity.
In light of the nature of the obligations that arise from within these
relationships, parties generally do not seek legal enforcement of entitlements
that flow from them. As Bob Gordon has written of relational contracts, "In
bad times the parties are expected to lend one another mutual support, not
stand on their rights; each will treat the other's insistence on literal
83 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1248.
84 See, e.g., Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at 1091 (arguing that contracts are relational to the extent that
"parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations"). Again, it
is important to draw attention to some of the new findings in the business literature, cited supra at note 64, that
prior relationships can lead to more customized and specific agreements than are traditionally associated with
relational contracting. The full implications of that finding must await a future date, but I do not think it
undermines the morphological similarity between relational contracts and friendships; both lead to more
information over time that will allow parties to fill in details of the nature of their expectations.
85 Wightman has argued that the reason for or source of incompleteness in relational contracts and
intimate relationships, like friendships, is different. Wightman, supra note 4, at 108-09. In relational
contracts, he argues that incompleteness results from trade usages, incomplete information, trust, transaction
costs, and/or information asymmetry. Id. By contrast, in intimate relationships, "leaving it open" is
constitutive of the relationship. Id. I am not sure I agree that the difference is so marked since virtually all of
the considerations in play in commercial contexts are likewise relevant in intimate relationships. As
Wightman also notes, power inequality within both types of relationships can cause incompleteness. Id.
86 These features of relational contracts are explored and explained in Goetz & Scott, supra note 23, at
1114 (describing the requirement of parties to relational contracts to maximize joint value from the
relationship); id. at 1149-50 (describing the "best efforts" requirement); Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1265-
67 (describing the "best efforts" requirement); Speidel, supra note 8, at 840-42 (exploring the heightened duty
of "good faith" in connection with relational contracts); id. at 838 (arguing that courts should facilitate
adjustments in relational contracts); and Wightman, supra note 4, at 103 (noting that within relational
contracts, new evolutions will lead to flexible adjustment of the underlying deal). See also Hillman, Court
Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, supra note 30, at 8.
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performance as willful obstructionism . ... 87 So long as the relationship is
still in place, meddling by the law is generally disfavored, 88 and most parties to
these relationships would think it bizarre and "countercultural" to seek legal
enforcement. 89  That said, upon dissolution of the relationship or upon a
substantial breach of an agreement evidencing betrayal or opportunism,
seeking remedies at law is not altogether uncommon, and the law will routinely
find a way to resolve such disputes. 90 Even though friendships and relational
contracts will generally not seem to the parties like legal relationships when
the parties are in them91-whether because they are successful or because
resorting to the law seems unpleasant and counter to the nature of the
relationship itself-legal enforcement of duties is reserved as a rare remedy for
certain types of defections from the parties' duties of good faith, best efforts,
and reasonable adjustment. Sometimes parties will seek to formalize some
portion of their deal, and sometimes they won't, but the threat of legal
sanctions is rarely the motivating factor for compliance. Even when some
formality is sought for a symbolic reason, the formality itself takes on its own
import, and legal enforceability is not obviously or necessarily contemplated
on account of the formality.92
The fact that resort to the law is rare does not mean that friends and those in
relational contracts lack mechanisms for enforcing the obligations that flow
from the relationship or within the relationship. Social norms internal to the
relationship play a strong role in keeping parties in line. They facilitate the
parties' cooperation over time, preventing defection and opportunism. Again,
87 Gordon, supra note 4, at 569.
88 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1269-70.
89 Of course, this is generally credited as Macaulay's insight about relational contracts in the sources
cited supra note 9. Some theorists of friendship have emphasized its "voluntary" nature, suggesting that
friends would find the intervention of the law into their rights and duties inappropriate. See generally Scott
Feld & William C. Carter, Foci of Activity as Changing Contexts for Friendship, in PLACING FRIENDSHP IN
CONTEXT 136 (Rebecca G. Adams & Graham Allan eds., 1998); Allan Silver, Friendship and Trust as Moral
Ideals: An Historical Approach, 30 EUR. J. Soc. 274 (1989) (arguing that friendships are quintessentially
voluntary). See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN EmcTs bk. VII, ch. 13, 11. 1162b22-b32; bk. IX, ch. 1,
11. 1164b12b15 (Terence Irwin trans., 1999) (arguing that friends must live by trust, not by law). I develop
and critique Aristotle's views on the subject at some length in Leib, supra note 20, at 647-53.
90 Disputes between friends and ex-friends are common. See generally Leib, supra note 22, at 700-20;
Leib, supra note 20, at 684-97.
91 See Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1298 ("Thus, the parties will agree to live under two sets of rules: a
more flexible set of rules for social and relational enforcement during the marriage, and a stricter set of rules
for legal enforcement upon divorce.").
92 See Terence Daintith, The Design and Performance of Long-Term Contracts, in CONTRACT AND
ORGANIZATION: LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE LIGHT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL THEORY 164, 187-88 (Terence
Daintith & Gunther Teubner eds., 1986); Campbell & Collins, supra note 55, at 39.
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although selflessness is rarely demanded of parties to these relationships, social
norms against overly selfish conduct will help parties avoid violating their
obligations to their counterparts. These social norms can be enforced through
practical concerns about keeping the relationship alive or about reputational
costs a defecting party may incur in the future as well as general stigmatic
concerns about being a good friend or a good business partner. 93 Friendship
certainly "constrain[s] the parties' freedom and influence[s] them toward
trustworthiness, fidelity, [and] honesty. . . . The threat of social censure
discourages conduct inconsistent with the announced norms. ' 94 Moreover, the
social "norms encourage interdependence and trust, which makes extrication
from the relationship costly, and they promote mutual oversight by each
[party] of the other's activities."
'95
How does that oversight occur? The very internalization of norms by the
parties serves to prevent defection in some measure. However, parties'
intimate disclosures and sincerity also serve as bonding and monitoring
mechanisms to reinforce trust that emerges from the relationship: Truth telling
and open communication help parties create the intimacy and faith that sustain
the relationship, in part because the risk of disclosure to others as a punishment
96for defection is salient in such relationships.
This set of dynamics-very complex and under-specified relationships,
social norms being responsible for policing friendships and relational
contracts, and legal norms playing only a bit part-also results in another
93 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1288, 1292 ("Social sanctions include reputational harms from gossip,
reduced social acceptance and ostracism.").
94 Id. at 1289; see also JOSEPH EPSTEIN, FRIENDSHIP: AN EXPOSE 69 (2006) ("Whatever else it has to do
with, friendship entails obligation-sometimes ample and demanding, sometimes miniscule and subtle, but
always, I believe, present.").
95 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1290.
96 Id. For some work on the role of truth telling and disclosure within friendship, see EPSTEIN, supra
note 94, at 40 ("[O]ne of the things one looks for in a friend . . . is the possibility of easy candor in
conversation."); Michel de Montaigne, Of Friendship, in THE COMPLETE ESSAYS OF MONTAIGNE 135, 136
(Donald M. Frame trans., 1958) ("Friendship feeds on communication .... "); Michel de Montaigne, Of the
Art of Discussion, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF MONTAIGNE 705 (Donald M. Frame trans., Stanford Univ.
Press 1967) (arguing that friendship "delights in the sharpness and vigor [of verbal] intercourse .... It is not
vigorous and generous enough if it is not quarrelsome, if it is civilized and artful, if it fears knocks and moves
with constraint."); ANDREW SULLIVAN, LOVE UNDETECTABLE: NOTES ON FRIENDSHIP, SEX, AND SURVIVAL
204 (1998) ("[T]he more you know a friend, the more a friend he is."); id. at 216 ("What do we tell our
friends? We tell them everything."); Dean Cocking & Jeanette Kennett, Friendship and the Self 108 ETHICS
502 (1998) (explaining, though rejecting, the "secrets" view of the friend); and Allan Silver, Friendship and
Sincerity, 4 SOZIALERSNN 123 (2003); Silver, supra note 20, at 1477 ("Friendship ... turns on intimacy-the
confident revelation of one's inner self to a trusted other-and on essentially expressive and consummatory
behavior.").
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important commonality between the two relationships: resistance to
formalizing parties' agreements and understandings. Although agreements and
understandings between parties to relational contracts and friendships are not
at all rare, the parties frequently wish to avoid formalities. It is not in the spirit
of the relationship to get too formal, and the very request for a formality from
one of the parties signals to the other that perhaps the relationship is taking on
a rather different character.97
In sum, many aspects of friendship are clarified when viewed through the
lens of relational contract theory. When we think of friendship as a relational
contract, we can get a better feel for why obligations within friendships are so
hard to specify, why we tend to specify them at a degree of generality and
vagueness, what they amount to, why we do not seek to use the law to control
conduct within friendships, and how we are still successful in maintaining
compliance though social norms. Although this window into describing
friendship cannot be exhaustive, it nevertheless proves to be a useful
perspective for understanding an implicit dimension of our friendships,
revealing their underlying structure, both practical and moral. We have
numerous portraits of friendship from sociology, 98 psychology,99 literary
studies, 1°°  religious studies, 1°1  political theory, 102  anthropology, 103  and
97 We may ask people to join our list of "friends" on Friendster or Facebook with a formal invitation, but
these are not generally thought of as core examples of real friendship since nothing about these lists requires
an actual relationship with any intimacy. Nevertheless, these invitations do sometimes bring the invitee into a
circle of confidence, in which personal details are disclosed to an "in-group." I discuss these issues more
extensively in the first chapter of my forthcoming book, Friend v. Friend: The Transformation of Friendship
and What the Law Has To Do with It.
98 See, e.g., GRAHAM A. ALLAN, A SOCIOLOGY OF FRIENDSHIP AND KINsHIP (1979); GRAHAM ALLAN,
FRIENDSHIP: DEVELOPING A SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1989) [hereinafter ALLAN, SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE]; GRAHAM ALLAN, KINSHIP AND FRIENDSHIP IN MODERN BRITAIN (1996) [hereinafter ALLAN,
MODERN BRITAIN]; CLAUDE S. FISCHER, TO DWELL AMONG FRIENDS: PERSONAL NETWORKS IN TOWN AND
CITY (1982); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY: SEXUALITY, LOVE & EROTICISM IN
MODERN SOCIETIES (1992); RAY PAUL, ON FRIENDSHIP (2000); PLACING FRIENDSHIP IN CONTEXT (Rebecca G.
Adams & Graham Allan eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONTExT]; LIz SPENCER & RAY PAHL, RETHINKING
FRIENDSHIP: HIDDEN SOLIDARITIES TODAY (2006).
99 See, e.g., THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: FRIENDSHIP IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE (William M.
Bukowski et al. eds., 1996); CONVERSATIONS OF FRIENDS: SPECULATIONS ON AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT (John
M. Gottman & Jeffrey G. Parker eds., 1986); THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN'S FRIENDSHIPS (Steven R.
Asher & John M. Gottman eds., 1981); BEVERLEY FEHR, FRIENDSHIP PROCESSES (1996); WILLIAM K.
RAWLINS, FRIENDSHIP MATTERS: COMMUNICATION, DIALECTICS, AND THE LIFE COURSE (1992); LILLIAN B.
RUBIN, JUST FRIENDS: THE ROLE OF FRIENDSHIP IN OUR LIvES (1985).
100 See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, LOvE AND FRIENDSHIP (1993); CALEB CRAIN, AMERICAN SYMPATHY: MEN,
FRIENDSHIP, AND LITERATURE IN THE NEW NATION (2001); RONALD A. SHARP, FRIENDSHIP AND LITERATURE:
SPIRIT AND FORM (1986); Wayne C. Booth, "The Way I Loved George Eliot": Friendship with Books as a
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philosophy, 104 but the structure of the relationship and its attendant obligations
can be further illuminated by understanding its morphological similarity to
relational contracts.
B. Some Cognitive Dissonance Managed
That it is useful to think of friendships as relational contracts does not, of
course, mean that one can make a clean one-to-one correlation between these
two types of relationships. There are many different sorts of friendships and
many kinds of contracts. Here I pursue a few discontinuities between the
relationships, attempting to downplay their significance for this project.
1. Value
From the perspective of human valuing, contractual relationships and
friendships surely occupy different places in our lives. Although most people
would say that both relational contracting and friendships are "valuable," they
would also likely concede that when valuing them they are operating with two
different conceptions of value. In the case of relational contracting, many
Neglected Critical Metaphor, KENYON REV., Spring 1980, at 4. See generally THE NORTON BOOK OF
FRIENDSHI (Eudora Welty & Ronald A. Sharp eds., 1991).
101 See, e.g., ALAN BRAY, THE FRIEND (2003); C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LovEs (1988); GILBERT
MEILAENDER, FRIENDSHIP: A STUDY IN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS (1981); GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL
ANALYSIS (1972).
102 See, e.g., HAuKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARITY: FROM CIVIC FRIENDSHIP TO A GLOBAL LEGAL
COMMUNITY (Jeffrey Flynn trans., Mass. Inst. Tech. Press 2005) (2002); JACQUES DERRIDA, THE POLITICS OF
FRIENDSHIP (George Collins trans., Verso 2005) (1994); LOvE AND FRIENDSHIP: RETHINKING POLITICS AND
AFFECTION IN MODERN TIMES (Eduardo A. Velasquez ed., 2003); JAMES R. MARTEL, LOVE IS A SWEET
CHAIN: DESIRE, AUTONOMY, AND FRIENDSHIP IN LIBERAL POLITICAL THEORY (2001); CARL SCHMITT, THE
CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., expanded ed., Univ. Chi. Press 2007) (1932); Jacques
Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, 85 J. PHIL. 632 (1988); James V. Schall, Friendship and Political
Philosophy, 50 REV. METAPHYSICS 121 (1996); Jason A. Scorza, Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship, 32
POL. THEORY 85 (2004).
103 See, e.g., ROBERT BRAIN, FRIENDS AND LOVERS (1976).
104 See, e.g., DAviD BOLOTIN, PLATO'S DIALOGUE ON FRIENDSHIP: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE Lysis,
WITH A NEW TRANSLATION (1979); John M. Cooper, Aristotle on Friendship, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S
ETHiCS 301 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980); HORST HUTTER, POLITICS AS FRIENDSHIP (1978); IMMANUEL
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 261-64 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1797);
PAUL SCHOLLMEIER, OTHER SELVES: ARISTOTLE ON PERSONAL AND POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP (1994); LORRAINE
SMITH PANGLE, ARISTOTLE AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (2003); SUZANNE STERN-GILLET,
ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (1995); Simon Keller, Friendship and Belief 33 PHIL. PAPERS 329
(2004); Anthony Kronman, Aristotle's Idea of Political Fraternity, 24 AM. J. JuRS. 114 (1979); Sibyl A.
Schwartzenbach, On Civic Friendship, 107 ETHICS 97 (1996); Sarah Stroud, Epistemic Partiality in
Friendship, 116 ETHICS 498 (2006); Jennifer E. Whiting, Impersonal Friends, 74 MONIST 3 (1991); see also
sources cited supra note 79.
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people would say that contracts are valued in a financial or instrumental sense
(for wealth generation or capital formation); friendships, by contrast, are
valued in themselves.
But what does it mean for something to be valued in itself? Philosophers
are helping us answer this question. In his recent account of valuing, Sam
Scheffler offers the following sketch (though he self-consciously refrains from
explaining whether his account can be linked with instrumental valuing):
[V]aluing any X involves at least the following elements: (1) A belief
that X is good or valuable or worthy, (2) A susceptibility to
experience a range of context-dependent emotions regarding X, (3) A
disposition to experience these emotions as being merited or
appropriate, and (4) A disposition to treat certain kinds of X-related
considerations as reasons for action in relevant deliberativecontexts.105
Central to Scheffler's picture of valuing is a form of emotional vulnerability
and a meta-requirement that the subject doing the valuing tends to regard that
vulnerability as merited. 106 Under this definition, it is relatively easy to see
how friendship routinely meets the requirements of human valuing, and it is
likewise plain that relational contracts are not obviously of the same character.
Although parties to relational contracts will tend to believe that their partners
are valuable or worthy and will be disposed to treat relationship-based
considerations as reasons for action, their emotional susceptibility in the
context of the relationship-its formation, maintenance, and success-should
be much more attenuated in the standard case than the emotional susceptibility
in the standard case of friendship.
The degree of attenuation of emotional vulnerability within relational
contracting highlights how different it is from friendship. Although some
relational contract partners might display emotional susceptibility, all
friendships must display this feature in substantial measure to qualify as an
instance of friendship and an instance of participation in the value of
105 SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, Valuing, in EQUALITY AND TRADITION (forthcoming May 2010).
106 Connecting valuing to emotional vulnerability is a feature of many philosophers' accounts of value and
valuing. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHIcs AND ECONOMICS 1-16 (1993); Niko Kolodny,
Love as Valuing a Relationship, 112 PHIL. REv. 135, 152 (2003) ("[V]aluing a relationship involves being
emotionally vulnerable to it .. "). Still, there are also alternative accounts. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, The
Importance of What We Care About, in THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 80 (1998) (focusing on
caring and the idea of something being important to someone); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH
OTHER 87-107 (1998) (defining friendship as a core example of value but not linking value with emotional
vulnerability).
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friendship. Moreover, without the disposition to experience the emotional
vulnerability as being merited or appropriate, parties would have a hard time
understanding themselves to be in a friendship. As a general matter this is not
the case with relational contracting partners. Although some such partners
may have a similar attitude toward their emotional vulnerability, we would
generally find such vulnerability inappropriate in a commercial context. At the
very least, we would expect those who exhibit such susceptibility (and those
who endorse their susceptibility) to have a pre-existing interpersonal
relationship upon which a relational contract was built.
Thus, from the perspective of valuation, there are clear differences between
friendships and parties to relational contracts: friendships are essentially
connected with our emotional lives (and only sometimes connected to our
financial lives), and relational contracts are essentially connected with our
financial lives (and only sometimes connected affectively to our emotional
lives). 1°7  Nevertheless, this does not prevent us from seeing friendships as
relational contracts, so long as we keep the analogy in perspective 8 That
each type of relationship is valued differently does not render it useless to think
of the relationships side-by-side. Although the type of value that each creates
differs from the other in a fundamental way, they are both relationships that are
valued by the parties within them, however attenuated emotional vulnerability
may be in relational contracting.
There is, however, another point worth considering. For some, it would
seem that the particular valuing process within friendship exists because it is
not thought of as contractual in any way.10 9 Generally, friends do not self-
consciously think in terms of contract, and doing so might be thought to debase
the relationship itself.110 If the moral value of friendship consists in complete
107 But see Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora's Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46 UCLA L. REv. 815,
827-28 (1999) ("I argue that far from being characterized solely by the cold calculation of self-interest
markets are erotic in the Hegelian-Lacanian sense that they are driven by the desire for recognition. Contract,
being mutual, reflects the true love relation in which recognition is freely granted and received by equals.").
log Even this differential form of valuing is, however, probably contingent. See generally Katharine W.
Swett, "The Account Between Us": Honor, Reciprocity and Companionship in Male Friendship in the Later
Seventeenth Century, 31 ALBION 1, 4 (1999) (arguing that early-modem era male friendships were
characterized by "potentially conflicting values" and "contradictory elements").
109 See, e.g., Ira Ellman, Why Making Family Law Is Hard, 35 ARiz. ST. L.J. 699, 711 (2003) ("The
problem with [treating intimate friendships as contracts] is that it does not acknowledge that duties can arise
from relationships themselves, apart from an exchange of promises that constitutes a contract."). The problem
with Ellman's view is that his contract theory puts explicit "exchanges of promises" at its center; relational
contract theory does not, so it is more amenable to acknowledging relational obligations as contractual ones.
110 For a related argument about marriage and contract, see Ellman, supra note 37, at 1367.
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voluntariness,111 exploring its morphological similarity to the domain of
contract-which seems to be about compliance backed by legal sanction-can
risk undermining what is so special about friendship. In some measure, this is
a variation of a similar argument we confronted earlier that is often launched
against relational contract theory more generally. 112
But as we can more clearly see by now, relationalists take the position that
it is only a crude caricature to see contracts as relationships solely backed by
legal sanction and interpersonal relationships as backed only by something
else. Both contracts and interpersonal relationships mix legal and non-legal
forms of sanctions to maintain compliance in the real world. 113  Real
obligations flow from each type of relationship, and real freedoms exist within
each relationship to defy the norms that control them. Neither of these
relationships is enforced specifically by the law at all times. The law rarely
requires specific performance of any contract (relational or otherwise) and
would likely turn its cheek if any friend tried to enforce a "mere" social duty of
friendship (like a dinner date).114 All the same, in both, the relationships can
be legally enforced to some extent, under certain conditions.! 15 It is hard to see
how we debase personal relationships by revealing that there is an implicit
contractual structure in them, especially when that contractual structure is
thoroughly relational. Special internal norms of heightened duties of care
pervade and control both contracts and interpersonal relationships. In both
instances the participants also share a complex and uncertain range of
responsibilities that emerge from the relationship itself.
111 See Peter Goodrich, The Immense Rumor, 16 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 199, 223 (2004) ("Banishing
friendship to the rites of passage or ceremonies of death keeps it hygienically private and squarely in the safety
of 'another context."'); Silver, supra note 20, at 1476 ("[F]riendship in modem society is a quintessentially
private relationship, not normatively constituted by public roles and obligations-[and] indeed, often in
distinction from them .. "); see also BRAIN, supra note 103, at 75 ("Friendship should be 'free,' 'pure,' and
based on moral obligations alone."); PAHL, supra note 98, at 63 ("There are no rules and contracts to bind us to
our closest friends: we simply have to trust them."). I have tried to complicate this story about friendship's
voluntariness in earlier work. See Leib, supra note 20, at 663-67.
112 See supra Part I.B, text accompanying notes 20-22. In particular, Bagchi argues that contracts risk"suffocating personal relationships that depend on their separateness from the civil order." Bagchi, supra note
21, at 35. I take on the "debasement" thesis more directly infra Part IV.C.113 A version of this argument is usefully spelled out in Bellia, supra note 22.
114 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 126 (6th ed. 2001) (citing
Horsley v. Chesselet, a 1978 case in which the Municipal Court of San Francisco refused to enforce an
agreement to go on a date, notwithstanding substantial reliance expenses).115 The details of this argument are deferred until Part IV.
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2. Exchange
A related concern is that contract is principally about exchange but
friendship is not. Contracts are surely premised on mutual benefit and a thin
form of reciprocity, but treating friendships as forms of transactional exchange,
which is implied by thinking of it in terms of contract, is crass and
inappropriate. Indeed, the visceral emotional reaction of taboo that some are
likely to feel at the very thought of friendships being "reduced" to contractual
or market relationships commands some response.116
Although, again, there may be something to the idea that different sorts of
exchanges are at work in relational contracts and friendships, there is also by
now a respectable window into interpersonal relations that shows them to be
meaningful forms of exchange. As Richard Lempert writes: "[A] number of
quite prominent sociologists and social psychologists are prepared to argue that
116 For a discussion of the taboo, see Alan Page Fiske & Philip E. Tetlock, Taboo Trade-Offs: Reactions
to Transactions that Transgress the Spheres of Justice, 18 POL. PSYCH. 255 (1997). However, that something
is taboo and may provoke anger or disorientation for destabilizing a presumed social order doesn't mean it is
wrong. Nor does it mean that it is avoidable. Fiske and Tetlock's argument actually suggests that it is almost
impossible to avoid making comparisons between markets and social spheres, and that we do so implicitly all
the time. See id. at 282, 292-94. In any case, part of my argument here assumes that the sphere of the
"market" is not as stranger-based as is traditionally assumed, so we should be less concerned about thinking of
the social sphere as having some apparent market traits. And the taboo does not seem to get triggered when
one suggests, as I do and will further, infra Part mII, that the market sphere of relational contracting partakes in
many of the value structures of friendship. See id. at 257 ("[P]eople are less disturbed by applications of
Communal norms to relations that they assume should be governed by prices (such an act may even seem
,nice').").
To the extent we reject thinking about friendship in this way because of the taboo, the taboo that
political psychologists have charted is about "pricing" the value of friendship, which is not something my
approach here requires. I am dealing in analogies, not full-scale commensurability. To say that friendships
can be illuminated by thinking of them as relational contracts is not to sum up the value of friendship through a
contract prism.
Indeed, Joseph Raz probably goes too far when he claims that "[i]t diminishes one's potentiality as a
human being to put a value on one's friendship in terms of improved living conditions." JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 353 (1986). If one could only value friendship in instrumental terms, it may be true
that one could not quite participate in friendships. But merely to notice that friendship has instrumental
components that contribute in part to its value even when practiced at its best hardly limits one from having
friends in the deepest sense. To concede that elements of friendship are commensurable in some ways with
certain "market" relations does not mean one cannot hold on to some weaker form of the incommensurability
thesis.
For a useful critique of the incommensurability thesis, see Eric A. Posner, The Strategic Basis of
Principled Behavior: A Critique of the Incommensurability Thesis, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1185 (1998). The
symposium in which Posner's manuscript appears is a helpful introduction to the subject. See generally
Matthew Adler, Symposium: Law and Incommensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1998).
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almost all social interaction [including friendship] may be profitably viewed as
exchange transactions." 11
7
To be sure, as Lempert recognizes, and as I concede, it would defy
common sense to see friendship as only exchange.1 18  According to Graham
Allan, friendship "is not really supposed to be a relationship in which each side
carefully weighs up the costs and rewards of their interaction before
proceeding, in the way that happens with, say, business contracts."'1 19
Consider, in this regard, a useful example drawn by Bob Ellickson:
Dinner guests, for example, commonly bring their host a gift such as
a bottle of wine. But no dinner guest would, instead of bringing
wine, arrive and say, "Here's twenty dollars. I've learned in an
Economics course that you'd undoubtedly prefer this to the usual
bottle of wine." The tender of cash would signal that the guest
thought of the dinner not as an occasion among friends but as an
occasion at a restaurant, where diners have a merely commercial
relationship with those who serve them. 
120
But this example-and Graham Allan's account above-relies upon a too
simplified picture of business and commercial relationships. That is, very
often business relationships are forged on the backs of friendships, 121 where it
is not easy to disentangle what is motivated by the commercial part of the
relationship and what is motivated by the friendship part of the relationship-
117 Richard Lempert, Norm-Making in Social Exchange: A Contract Law Model, 7 LAW & Soc'y REV. 1,
2 (1972) (citing three "exchange theory" classics: PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE
(1964); GEORGE CASPAR HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961); and George C.
Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. SOC. 597 (1958)).
118 Lempert, supra note 117, at 2-3.
119 ALLAN, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 98, at 19; see also Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 116,
at 267: "[W]hen either party merely starts to keep track of how much they give and how much they get, a
Communal Sharing relationship is in trouble. The very act of keeping accounts... seriously undermines the
relationship.... Even to remind the other of asymmetries is unkind and distancing .... I find this a bit too
precious. Of course we keep accounts, even if just approximately. We are generally generous with one
another in these relationships and hope for reciprocation over a long time horizon, since we are confident in a
future. But when things get out of hand and one friend is doing a lot more than the other to keep the
relationship going and intimate, no one should be surprised if one friend confronts the other for an
accounting-or terminates the relationship.
120 ELLICKSON, supra note 9, at 235.
121 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 151 ("Contracting parties are often friends."). See generally DiMaggio
& Louch, supra note 10 (examining the impact of friendships on consumer transactions); Ingrain & Zou, supra
note 10 (exploring "business friendships"); Ingram & Roberts, supra note 10 (arguing that friendships between
business competitors are beneficial); Perrone et al., supra note 10; Uzzi, Financial Capital, supra note 10
(arguing that social ties promote trust that can facilitate lending relationships); Uzzi, Sources and
Consequences, supra note 10 (exploring how social ties affect economic action in the apparel industry).
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the confusion may exist not only to outside observers but to the parties as
well.122
More significantly for my purpose here, friends' purported desires to prove
that their relationships are different from "mere" commercial or business
enterprises do not vitiate the claim that there is an undeniable element of
exchange embedded in every friendship. 123  As I suggested earlier, much of
124what appears as "altruism" can be modeled as exchange. Friendships
generate a sense of debt since our friends routinely help us out. Although we
may say, when we are feeling romantic, that acts of friendships are never
undertaken out of a sense of obligation, friendship's very foundation in
reciprocity, equality, and warmth virtually requires some evenness in
exchange. If we take more than we give, if we fail to reciprocate with our
friend's effort over time, if gifts and favors stop going back and forth, the
friendship cannot continue.125  Friendship is not exhausted by peering at it
through the lens of exchange, but it is a central feature of the relationship-and
seeing friendships as relational contracts helps reveal that dimension of them.
Ellickson observes:
Fellow-feeling seems more likely to arise when [parties] are seen to
act out of friendship, not out of a need to scratch each other's backs.
Close friends have such a long future ahead of them that they need
not worry about minor imbalances in the reciprocated favors between
them. Therefore, a person who mentions that accounts have fallen a
122 A particularly useful study of this dynamic can be found in Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change:
The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 719 (1973); see
also Nick Rumens, Working at Intimacy: Gay Men's Workplace Friendships, 15 GENDER, WORK & ORG. 9, 12
(2008) ("[I]ntimacy and instrumentality are sometimes distinct but often overlapping and temporal modes of
relating. There may be many pathways to intimacy, some ofwhich may originate within or are generated from
the pursuit of instrumental endeavors.").
123 ALLAN, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 98, at 22.
124 See supra notes 77-78.
125 For more on these dimensions of friendship, see ALLAN, MODERN BRITAIN, supra note 98, at 89
("Friendship, in whatever form it takes, is defined as a relationship between equals."); ALLAN, SOCIOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 98, at 108 ("The essence of friendship from a sociological standpoint is that it is a tie
of equality."); BRAIN, supra note 103, at 20 ("Equality... is part and parcel of friendship."); FRiEDMAN, supra
note 79, at 211 ("[V]oluntariness in friendship seems to require, overall, a measure of roughly equal and
mutual adaptation, a synergism achieved through the combined and mutually interested adjustments of those
who are becoming, or are already, friends."); PAI, supra note 98, at 162 (arguing that friendship is
"egalitarian"); Graham Allan, Friendship and the Private Sphere, in CONTEXT, supra note 98, at 71, 77
(recognizing the importance of "reciprocity" in friendship); and Pat O'Connor, Women's Friendships in a
Post-Modern World, in CONTEXT, supra note 98, at 117, 127 ("[F]riendship is a relationship between
equals.").
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bit out of balance indicates either a lack of intimacy or some
skepticism about future solidarity. 1
26
Be that as it may, this dynamic is no less true of parties to relational contracts,
who are also eager to make displays of friendship within a larger network of
exchange.
3. Unity of Interests
Some might suggest that the interpersonal relationship of friendship rests
upon a unity of interests that could never be mirrored in relational contracts.
Ultimately, friends engage in reciprocity because they wish their counterparts
well for their own sake-and they share so many interests that they can be
treated as second selves. 127  No commercial relationship, the presumptive
domain of contract, can unify the interests of the parties in the way friendship
128can.
There is a kernel of truth to this difference between friendship and
relational contracts. Indeed, the closer friends are, the more unified their
interests. 129  And the more unified their interests, the less the relationship
seems like a contract, if one assumes for the moment that relational contracts
do not create unified interests in the standard case. Even if contractual partners
are not modeled as having adverse interests (and many contract partners need
to collaborate to maximize the surplus within the relationship), it would be odd
to think they have unified interests in the way we might presume friends do.
Yet some things can be said to take the sting out of this reality check. First,
this too is an overly romantic conception of the standard case of friendship. In
126 ELLICKSON, supra note 9, at 236.
127 On wishing friends well for their own sake, see ARISTOTLE, supra note 89, at bk. VIII, ch. 3, 11.
1156b10-b12; id. at bk. VIII, ch. 2, 11. 1155b33-b34. For the literature on friends as second selves, see, for
example, id. at bk. IX, ch. 9, 11. 1170b5-b8 ("[A] friend is another []self.") and MoNTAiGNE, supra note 96, at
141, 143 (arguing that friends are of "one soul in two bodies" and maintain a "fusion of... wills" and are a
"second self'). Sometimes, this latter dimension of friendship is described as "agreement," "concord," or"consensus." See ARISTOTLE, supra note 89, at bk. IX, ch. 6, 11. 1167a22-b15 (noting that friends have similar
judgments about their common interests); EPSTEIN, supra note 96, at 60 (citing Cicero's suggestion that
friendship requires "agreement over all things divine and human"); Goodrich, supra note 111, at 211-12
(discussing concord and agreement).
128 But see generally Markovits, supra note 19 (arguing that contracts are collaborations that unify party
interests). Markovits could, however, distinguish the unification of interests in contracts and the unification of
interests in friendship by highlighting the limited scope of the unification in contracts (friendship requires a
broader scope of unity) and the lack of affective association in contractual collaboration.
129 This is why, perhaps, as friends get closer it makes greater sense to treat them as fiduciaries, not as
"mere" relational contractors. For the argument to view close friends as fiduciaries, see Leib, supra note 22.
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the average friendship (even if not its paradigmatic form, perhaps), friends
rarely have unified interests. They have many priorities and several friends, all
competing for attention. Even in our most intimate relationships, we have to
juggle too much to impute perfectly unified interests to friends. It just is not
possible for parties to a friendship to always have unified interests, especially
when a friend's lover, parent, employer, professor, or child is also competing
for attention. Indeed, some might argue that conflict and conflict resolution
techniques are also constitutive of friendship. 13  Wishing a friend well for her
own sake is, perhaps, different from taking on her interests as our own
priorities on a routine basis.
Moreover, we only rarely own property in common with friends-and even
if we do not find ourselves literally competing for property in our
friendships, 131 we are bound to have disparate interests on a number of fronts,
both personal and professional. Although we are undoubtedly expected to be
generous with our friends and treat them with good faith, few of us expect our
friends to put our interests on equal footing with their own. In a rare case
(such as a "best" friend or an emergency), we might expect such loyalty, but
that is not the general rule.
The institution of contract is also being a bit under-romanticized here as
well. Relational contract theory highlights just how much interdependence and
unity of interest can be created through the relational contract itself (and the
underlying relationships that are part of the contractual matrix). Accordingly,
it might be fairer than it seems at first to put friendship and relational contract
side-by-side on the dimension of the unity of interests. 132 In the standard cases
of each, neither establishes a perfect unity of interest, but both establish some
unity, limited in scope.
130 1 defend this view in Leib, supra note 20, at 646-47 (citing EPSTEIN, supra note 94, at 240-41;
MONTAIGNE, The Art of Discussion, supra note 96, at 705; PAHL, supra note 98, at 86; SULLIVAN, supra note
96, at 204; BERNARD YACK, TH-E PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL: COMMUNITY, JUSTICE, AND CONFLICT IN
ARISTOTELIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 110 (1993)).
131 See Stuart Oskamp & Daniel Perlman, Effects of Friendship and Disliking on Cooperation in a Mixed-
Motive Game, 10 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 221, 221 (1966) (suggesting that friendship can sometimes discourage
parties from cooperating in a cooperation game because of competitive urges); Graham M. Vaughan et al.,
Bias in Reward Allocation in an Intergroup and an Interpersonal Context, 44 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 37, 40 (1981)
(finding that young friends will allocate as much to their friends as to an arbitrary in-group).
132 One can also see this morphology through the use of Markovits's theory of contract as collaboration.
Although he overstates the distinction between contracts and interpersonal relations because he thinks
contracts cannot have an affective dimension, one can see through his theory (portions of which could be
adapted by relationalists, mutatis mutandis) how relational contracts can establish a similar interest-structure
that prevails in friendships. See Markovits, supra note 19, at 1432, 1451.
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4. Natural Persons, Friendship, and Organizations
We might appreciate that something is amiss in thinking about friendships
as relational contracts when we realize that friendships must be limited to
natural persons, but relational contracts have no such limitation. Corporations
and organizations can be friends only by analogy because only natural
individuals can be friends. And, yet, as I have argued in other work, it is more
than likely that contracts between organizations ("Type 3" contracts) and
contracts between organizations and natural persons ("Type 2" contracts) are
just as much at the core of contract as are contracts between natural persons
("Type 1" contracts). 133 So how can a practice-friendship-that reasonably
comes only in the shape of a Type 1 contract be illuminated by a practice-
relational contract-that has many other shapes (in which friendship may not
partake by its very nature)?
It turns out this is not much of a challenge for this portion of my argument.
Perhaps this challenge shows some limits to my general argument-there are
real differences between contract as a social practice and friendship as a social
practice. But analogical arguments do not require perfect correspondence of
the concepts being compared. Of course, differences in the subjects of the
analogy may counsel for differential treatment of the two things being
compared when we turn to operationalizing the upshot of the analogy. But I do
not think the analogy is threatened by showing a mere difference. In any case,
nothing about this failure of perfect isomorphism vitiates the usefulness of
thinking about friendship as, in certain respects, a prototypical Type 1
relational contract. 134  Although this observation about the shapes in which
relational contracts come and the shape in which a friendship must come may
raise some problems for portions of the analysis to follow-where I suggest
that friendship be thought of as the paradigmatic relational contract-at least
for this part of my argument, this observation presents no barrier. I am not
arguing here that all relational contracts are friendships, only that all
133 See Leib, supra note 29, at 2-3, 9-20.
134 Perhaps I am throwing in the towel too quickly here. As Verity Winship observed in a conversation
regarding a prior draft, we do have groups of friends to whom we relate qua group-and we also have
relationships with couples (whether as couples ourselves or as individuals). These sorts of friendships might,
after all, serve as plausible analogies for Type 2 and Type 3 contracts. I have not worked out how that might
be played out through the rest of my analysis, but I think it is a provocative suggestion. Indeed, much of the
economic sociology cited supra note 10 clearly assumes that friendships among organizations can be
meaningful. See Ingram & Roberts, supra note 10, at 387. And a recent article about friendships between
countries similarly suggests that organizational friendship is a meaningful concept. See P.E. Digeser,
Friendship Between States, 39 BRIT. J. POL. Sc. 323 (2009).
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friendships display central properties of relational contracts-and that this
observation is useful to understanding the dynamics within and the
requirements of friendship.
III. RELATIONAL CONTRACT AS FRIENDSHIP
I observed at the outset that relational contract theorists tend to want to
treat relational contracts as types of marriages. 135 My hope here is to expose
the benefits of treating relational contracts as types of friendships rather than
types of marriages. Reorienting the paradigmatic relational contract to be a
friendship rather than a marriage has several benefits. And this reorientation
should furnish several lessons for relational contract theory and relational
contract law, to be explored in Part IV. In any case, relational contracts are
more like friendships than they are like marriages.
A. De-centering Marriage
First, there are very good reasons to de-center marriage quite generally
from the various roles it currently plays in our legal system. Consider some of
the reasons recently suggested by scholars with quite different points of view:
(1) privileging marriage excludes those who cannot partake in marriage in a
way privileging equal-opportunity friendship does not;136 (2) privileging
marriage contributes to gender inequality in our society in a way the promotion
of friendship may not;137 and (3) de-centering marriage could "enable[] new
forms of commitment, responsibility, love, care, and relatedness other thanthose of idealized 'mother' and 'father,"' and "husband" and "wife. 138
135 See sources cited supra note 4.
136 See generally NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing that the law should not impute more value to marriage than to
other family forms); Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins & Ethan J. Leib, Criminal Justice and the Challenge of
Family Ties, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 1147, 1153 (2007) ("[F]amily ties preferences can disrupt norms of equality that
should otherwise prevail in an attractive regime of liberal governance.").
137 See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 ICH. L. REv. 189, 191 (2007) ("The gendered
prerequisites of marriage are seen as unrelated to family law's goal of achieving gender equality, thereby
permitting the boundaries of the legal family to continue to perpetuate gender inequality.").
138 Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2705 (2008). Franke's very
recent turn toward friendship is exciting for those of us who have been working in this area. I have qualms
about some of her claims in the article about what friendship is-and about how she imagines that we ought to
orient the law towards friendship. However, I am very sympathetic to her project of re-centering our lives and
law toward friendship to displace the overwhelming role of marriage.
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In short, to the extent that we model the ideal form of a relational contract
on marriage rather than friendship, we are unnecessarily, and to our detriment,
reinforcing marriage's centrality in our private and public law.139 Even if one
thinks-as many relationalists do--that certain contractual obligations emerge
from the complex relationships to which partners are parties rather than from
the partners' discrete promises to each other, we need not model those
obligations on the status-oriented obligations married spouses have. Real
obligations can stem from other relationships, too.14°  Friendships can serve as
this model all the same, without needing to buy into the normative agenda that
props up marriage's centrality to our lives and law.
In addition, so much of the law's orientation to and regulation of marriage
has to do with regulating sex and child-rearing that it would seem odd to
compare commercial contracts and their regulation with the law's concerns in
regulating marriage. Although calling contracts types of friendships will also
produce some imperfect correlations, the concern with gender, sex, and child-
rearing so predominates the law of marriage that it is a poor source of
relational contract law. However, some relationalists still might embrace the
marriage analogy precisely because adjudication in marriage and divorce (as in
some commercial contexts) often needs to weigh the interests of affected third
parties (children, in particular). Centering friendship does, indeed, lose this
dimension of comparison. But, in any case, the comparison is a weak one.
The prevailing standard of the child third-party's "best interests" could only be
useful in adjudicating the rights of third parties to relational contracts in
extremely rare circumstances. Furthermore, friendship as a source of relational
contract law would not cause quite as much of a distortion since it is a gender-
neutral practice, 141 in which sex and child-rearing are not considered essential
components of the relationship.
139 See Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal Construction of the
Family and the State, 112 YALE L.J. 1641, 1712 (2003) ("[M]arriage continues to regulate the terrain outside
of its formal borders, preserving its legal and ideological supremacy as a normative model for all intimate
relations and as an arbiter of which relationships deserve legal recognition and protection."); Franke, supra
note 138, at 2698 ("To borrow a term Janet Halley has recently put to much use, all of us are conscripted into
the cause of 'carrying a brief for' marriage whether or not we so wish." (quoting JANET HALLEY, SPLT
DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMImSM 17 (2006)).
140 On relational obligations more generally, see Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26
PHiL. & PUB. AFF. 189 (1997).
141 1 discuss gender and friendship in Leib, supra note 20, at 667-69. There, I make clear that it is actually
controversial to see friendship as gender-neutral. Still, unlike marriage under federal law and the laws of most states,
friendship is not gendered by law.
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B. Exit Costs
Relationalists seek to highlight the similarity between relational contracts
and marriages because exit costs from both are quite high. Getting divorced is
usually quite an elaborate affair, and the decision to divorce is rarely made
casually. Parties grow interdependent throughout a marriage, and that
interdependence is the very feature relationalists claim also exists within
relational contracts. As David Friedman writes:
Once a couple has been married for a while, they have made a lot of
relationship-specific investments, [bearing] costs that will produce a
return only if they remain together. Each has become, at
considerable cost, an expert on how to get along with the other. Both
have invested, materially and emotionally, in their joint children....
[T]hey are now locked into a bilateral monopoly with associated
bargaining costs.142
But friendship is actually the better analogy here. Friends also display the
relevant sort of interdependence with high exit costs (relative to the exit costs
generally associated with relations between strangers). But the exit costs of
marriage are too high to serve as a baseline for relational contracts.
Friendship's exit costs are also substantial, to be sure, with real prices to pay
for extricating oneself,143 but the costs are usually lower and much closer to
what we might tend to think is true in the relational contract sphere. Parties to
a friendship and parties to relational contracts are generally free to terminate
the relationship in a way that marriage partners are not. Marriage partners
must turn to law-and pay for it. Divorce is never free. It carries a much
bigger transaction cost than terminating a friendship or a relational contract,
which parties are generally free to do without the help of the law. 14  On thedimension of exit costs, then-which is supposed to be a useful dimension of
142 DAviD D. FRIEDMAN, LAW' S ORDER: WHAT EcoNOMIcS HAS TO Do WiTH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS
172(2000).
143 Indeed, unlike marriage, there is rarely a moment of divorce in friendship. In the standard case,
friends don't really break up; it is a slow process of developing new, more intimate ties elsewhere. Still,
although it is easy to point out when a marriage ends officially, the actual process of breaking up and growing
apart over time does seem to resemble the exiting process of friendships. Unless there is a massive betrayal in
either case, it is hard to say when things have turned irrevocably against the relationship's durability.
144 To be sure, they may have to turn to lawyers and may be prevented from free exit because they have to
pay damages first-in both relational contracts and friendships. But the analogy with marriage doesn't hold;
no one needs the state's permission to terminate these other types of relationships. Additionally, many
relational contracts will be like friendships in yet another way: there will be no agreement to terminate, just a
walking away, a growing apart, a fizzle. And that type of ending will also rarely trigger legal involvement.
This is not so in marriages, where even amicable dissolutions require elaborate legal intervention.
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comparison between marriages and relational contracts-it turns out that
friendship is the better model.
Although it is undoubtedly true that marriage "adds an overlay of legal and
social sanctions that further restrict the freedom to renege and thus strengthen
each partner's commitment," 145 friendships resemble relational contracts better
than marriages. Relational contract partners, like friends, are bound in a web
of social relations, and they do not need the law's permission to extricate
themselves therefrom, as they would in a marriage. Free exit affects the
success of the social norms' enforcement capabilities in both friendship and
relational contracts, 146 but in both sets of relationships, social norms
nevertheless do the vast majority of the work in motivating the parties to
cooperate and comply with their underlying deals.
C. Exclusivity
Marriages, for the time being, can only be valid between two individuals
and must be exclusive. That just isn't the case with friendships. Even if
friendships are essentially dyadic, 147 we can certainly have more than one
friend. Since the realm of contract clearly does not limit parties to one partner,
friendships are again a better analogy than marriages.
There is something more here too-and it relates to an earlier point about
interdependence. Although relational contracts tend to breed and feed off of
interdependence, the degree of that interdependence is not commensurate with
the degree of interdependence in purely exclusive relationships and bilateral
monopolies. To be sure, some relational contracts are bilateral monopolies,
but they need not be at their core. Friendship is more true to the nature of the
relational contract because it is not a betrayal to have other partners, so long as
one deals with counterparts in good faith. This point also relates back to the
discussion about the lack of the unity of interests in relational contracts and
friendships. Marriages command a type of extreme internal egalitarianism 148
145 Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1255.
146 POSNER, supra note 5, at 77.
147 1 discuss the potentially dyadic nature of friendship in Leib, supra note 20, at 644 n.50. More
generally, in my earlier work I conclude that friendship must be "exclusive," but that exclusivity is of a
different type than the one that must prevail in marriage. See id. After all, infidelity in marriage is actually
criminalized in many states and the District of Columbia. Jennifer M. Collins, Ethan J. Leib & Dan Markel,
Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REv. 1327, 1411 (2008) (citing Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law:
Compulsory Monogamy andPolyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 277, 290 n.49).
148 For more on this feature of marriage, see Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage,
104 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 81-98 (2004).
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that friendships simply do not (even though they too are predicated on a certain
form of equality). 14
9
D. Common Ownership
In marriage, common ownership of property is a very common
arrangement. At marriage dissolution, most states will enforce some version of
common ownership of all marital property. 150  Yet, in neither relational
contracts nor friendships would we generally assume that the parties intend to
share their property in joint ownership. To be sure, some very close friends
and business partnerships have such arrangements. But friendships and
relational contracts do not generally display this ownership pattern, which is
quite typical within marriages. This difference between marriages and
relational contracts is instructive for how we might set up a law to regulate
relational contracts on the one hand and marriages on the other, so it is best to
model the relational contract on the type of property assumptions that prevail
within friendships. To treat all relational contracts as marriage partnerships
would not be true to the prevailing ethos within relational contracts, which are
closer to friendships in this respect.
E. Default Rules
There is a more general point to make about default rules and marriage.
For the most part, marriage law is full of mandatory rules, not default rules that
parties may circumvent by agreement if they choose. 151  By contrast,
relationalists have argued for relatively few mandatory rules (like robust good
faith and best efforts requirements). There is an assumption that parties may
still contract around whatever other default rules the law will create for them.
Friendship seems to work this way too-there are precious few mandatory
rules (though robust good faith and best efforts in performance may very well
be two of them, for without both it is hard to call the relationship a friendship
in the first instance). But other than these two mandatory duties, most
friendships, like relational contracts and unlike marriages, admit a wide range
of choices about how to structure and perform duties in the relationship. As
friendships get closer to marriages in intimacy and interdependence, they get
closer to fiduciary relationships-with their attendant set of more elaborate
149 For sources on equality in friendship, see supra note 125.
150 See Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1270-71.
151 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5, at 79.
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mandatory duties. 152  But the general case of relational contract seems much
more analogous to the general case of friendship than to the general case of
marriage.
F. Formalities
There is an important difference between marriages and relational contracts
from the standpoint of relational contract theory-and the difference is so
central that it is rather surprising that relational contract theorists so often talk
about contracts as marriages. Marriages generally cannot be entered or exited
without clear formalities that are extremely easy for outsiders to spot.153 Yet
relationalists generally argue that although those who enter relational contracts
sometimes use formalities, they do not rely on them exclusively. For
relationalists, there need not always be clear formalities between parties to
establish contractual obligation, and courts should not necessarily require
formalities to find contractual liability. 15 4  Indeed, this element of relational
contract theory is the one most opposed by formalists, who certainly do not
want courts to find that contracts have been formed without first establishing
that the parties have engaged in the relevant formalities-like offers, mirror-
image acceptances, writings (where required by the statute of frauds), and
consideration. Relationalists are much more comfortable with implied
agreements found through conduct and other informal acts. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the law and economics scholars who embrace the idea of
relational contract as marriage and marriage as relational contract have veered
152 See generally Leib, supra note 22 (arguing that close friends can be thought of as fiduciaries). It
should be noted that there is a danger in having most or many contracts trigger the fiduciary duties we tend to
associate with spouses; we might cause a "stifling despotism of virtue" within contractual relations. See
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561, 641 (1983). This is
part of why it is generally best to see relational contracts as "mere" friendships (and vice-versa)--and only very
close friends as fiduciaries.
153 Common law marriage is clearly the exception to this rule. But common law marriage is rare (it exists
in nine states and the District of Columbia) and getting rarer still even though five states have grandfathered
couples under earlier, and now repealed, common law marriage laws. See Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures, Common Law Marriage (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/commonlaw.htm. Moreover,
even if a couple "marries" through a common law marriage, the parties must make formal showings to receive
treatment as a married couple (by, for example, changing their last names to match one another's, filing joint
tax returns, or holding themselves out to the public as married), and may only dissolve their relationship
through a formal divorce.
154 See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 817-18.
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toward formalism since marriage is very formalistic at both formation and
break up.155
Here, friendship seems like the better analogy to relational contracts, at
least from the perspective of relational contract theory. The relationship of
friendship tends to be fluid (there is rarely a magic moment of formation); it
does not rely on formalities for entry or exit (at least for now and at least in the
United States); 156 it is not regulated by law upon entry and exit (as marriage
is); 157 and it can create obligations in non-formalistic ways. 158  Formal entry
and exit does not reflect the reality of practice in relational contracting, so
friendship is the better paradigm.
Although contracts can be formalized, what is distinctive about relational
contracts is that even when some part of the relationship is formalized, there is
155 Compare POSNER, supra note 5, at 69-70, 160 (embracing, from the point of view of a legal
economist, the model of relational contract as marriage), and Scott & Scott, supra note 6 (discussing how
marriage can be thought of as a relational contract), with Posner, supra note 50 (endorsing formalism from the
same point of view of a legal economist who embraces the relational-contract-as-marriage model), and Scott,
supra note 8 (embracing formalism from the perspective of a legal economist who embraces the relational
contract-as-marriage model). I should distinguish formalism about formation from formalism about
interpretation. Although these formalists embrace formalism across the board, here I am only talking about
formalism about formation.
156 But see HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572c-1 to -7 (2009) (illustrating a "reciprocal-beneficiary" statute allowing
parties to contract into a form of friendship); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1301-1306 (2002) (also a "reciprocal-
beneficiary" statute); BRArN, supra note 103, 106-07 (urging more ceremony surrounding friendship formation);
David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, A Status Other than Marriage, 76 NoTRE
DAMfE L. REv. 1347, 1348 (2001) (arguing for a "designated friend" registry, enabling the state to keep track of
who is entering friendships); Leib, supra note 20, at 683 n.267 (explaining the German custom of Brilderschaft
trinken, which is a friendship ceremony of sorts and considering the value of establishing more ceremonies for
entering friendships). Under the Hawaii statute cited above, "reciprocal beneficiary status [is] available to
heterosexual couples unable to marry, such as brother-and-sister, father-and-daughter, and mother-and-son couples, as
well as to same-sex couples.... [and provides] many benefits available to married couples including... the right to
hold property by tenancy of the entireties, eligibility for health insurance coverage as family members, wrongful death
and loss of consortium claims, [and] family and funeral employment leave.. Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs
of Civil Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 WiDNER J. PuB. L. 401, 415 (2002) (footnote
omitted). The Vermont statute allows "couples related by blood or adoption to register in a new nonmarital status and
receive nominal marital rights and benefits, mostly relating to health care and final medical decisions." Id at 417. See
also Rosenbury, supra note 137 at 223 ("The status of designated friends could therefore be described as a 'marriage-
lite' approach." (quoting J. Thomas Oldham, Lessons from Jerry Hall v. Mick Jagger Regarding U.S. Regulation of
Heterosexual Cohabitants, or, Can't Get No Satisfaction, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1430-33 (2001)).
157 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 77.
158 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 79, at 208-09 ("Friendship receives far less formal recognition in
our rituals and conventions . ..than do familial relationships and is maintained by fewer of those
formalities."). Although I have argued, see Leib, supra note 20, at 685-94, and will argue infra Part IV, for
establishing some legal obligations that emanate from friendship, the ones I have in mind here to establish the
analogy are only ethical obligations.
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much more to the deal besides the formalities. One could say the same of
friends, too: although surely friends can enter formal contracts (and
unquestionably legally enforceable (relational!) contracts too), relational
contract theory would emphasize the underlying social relationship that is an
additional source of obligation. In any case, in relational contracts, as in
friendship, formalities are the rare case; in marriage, formality is the standard
case and is a prerequisite to getting the relationship off the ground in the first
place.
G. Enforceability of Intra-relational Promises
Finally, if we model relational contracts on marriages, we risk reaching a
potentially perverse result where promises within commercial relationships-
even ones that are written down and bargained for-could be rendered
unenforceable. This is at odds with the normative dimension of relational
contract theory, which recommends the enforceability of internal norms and
promises formed within relational contracts.
Only in extremely rare cases will courts enforce agreements between
contracting spouses, even if they are accompanied by formalities like writings• . 159
and consideration. Whether owing to the court's failure to find that the
parties intended to create legal relations or because of public policy, courts
tend to refuse to adjudicate contractual disputes between spouses within a
marriage. The conceit routinely offered is that the law wishes to afford a
bubble of autonomy for the household-and this is one way to give effect to
that autonomy. 16  While many relationalists have tried to argue that this
approach is mistaken, few contest the description of the law. 161 Accordingly, it
is potentially bizarre to model the relational contract on a type of relationship
that generally cannot take advantage of contract law.
159 See, e.g., Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 Eng. Rep. 571, 575 (K.B.) (finding agreement by separated
husband and wife for support unenforceable); Miller v. Miller, 35 N.W. 464, 464 (Iowa 1887) (finding written
agreement between husband and wife unenforceable). For a largely supportive argument in favor of Balfour, see
Stephen Hedley, Keeping Contract in Its Place Balfour v. Balfour and the Enforceability of InformalAgreements, 5
O.L.S. 391 (1985). For other (not quite relational) approaches to Balfour, see Michael Freeman, Contracting
in the Haven: Balfour v. Balfour Revisited, in EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF CONTRACT 68, 68-82 (Roger
Halson ed., 1996); Peter Goodrich, Friends in High Places: Amity andAgreement inAlsatia, 1 INT'LJ. L. CONTExT
41,44-46 (2005).
160 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 68. However, Posner readily concedes that the "autonomy" description
is an odd one-and hard to reconcile with how the law actually regulates the family. Id at 68-69.
161 See, e.g., Wightman, supra note 4, at 94; Mary Keyes & Kylie Bums, Contract and the Family:
Whither Intention?, 26 MELB. U. L. REv. 577, 578 (2002).
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By contrast, despite some underdeveloped enthusiasm for the view that
friends should be wholly immune from the law, 162 few would really argue that
contractual obligations between friends should be held unenforceable as a
categorical matter. To be sure, we may agree that certain promises or
commitments would not rise to the level of enforceable obligations, and that
there is something distinctive about obligations within relationships of
friendship that would leave some of them to be enforced principally by social
norms rather than the law. Yet, most would agree that friends can undertake
contractual obligations to one another through writings and formalities and
should have no trouble as a general matter getting the law to enforce such
agreements. 163 Relational contracts exhibit this same dynamic. Like friends,
parties to a relational contract ought to have no trouble with enforceability as a
general matter, even if some of the deal is to be enforced by social norms
rather than the law. Married partners do in fact have such trouble entering into
enforceable contracts; accordingly, relational contracts are better modeled as a
friendship on this dimension.
H. A Caveat or Three
I hope I have shown here why friendship rather than marriage ought to
serve as the paradigmatic relational contract. Does this really mean that all
contracts are friendships? I am not committed to that view. Instead, I hope to
have shown through Parts II and III that relational contracts partake in the
morphology of friendship (and vice-versa) and can usefully be analyzed
through their similarities to the structures of friendships. Not all contracts are
the same, and not all friendships are the same. But putting the two concepts
side-by-side is both a useful exercise on its own and, ultimately, a more useful
exercise than putting relational contracts and marriages side-by-side.
Analogical and morphological reasoning does not commit me to the full-scale
identity of relational contracts as friendships, only to the idea that they have
relevant similarities that can help us understand each concept better.164
162 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 89, at bk. VIII, ch. 13, 11. 1162b22-b32; id. at bk. IX, ch. 1, 11.
1164b12-bi5 (discussing how some cities do not allow legal actions on contracts between friends); Franke,
supra note 138, at 2705.
163 An area of likely dispute between relationalists and non-relationalists would be whether friends can
generate legally enforceable obligations to each other without formalities. See infra note 175. The
relationalists might allow it because (some) social norms are meant to be incorporated by the law-and
relationalists don't fetishize promissory or formal obligation as the core of contract. The non-relationalist
would have none of this. I pursue this territory infra Part IV.
164 See generally LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON: THE USE OF ANALOGY IN LEGAL ARGUMENT
(2005). Perhaps those who have been urging the relational-contract-as-marriage analogy would respond by
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To be sure, many relational contracts are built upon the edifice of a
friendship, and the pre-existing friendship itself is the predicate that creates the
relational character to the contract. Consider Eric Posner's observation:
"[W]hat appears to be an arm's length contract between two anonymous firms
is often the result of negotiations between two friends who belong to the same
social club or sit on the board of the same charitable
organization. . . . Contracting parties are often friends. 165 And sometimes
friendship is not the predicate for the relational contract but is a result of the
relationship triggered under the contract. Posner further observes that
"[f]riendships arise not as the natural byproduct of time spent together and
mutual interest; on the contrary, parties spend a great deal of effort, time, and
money trying to make friends" to further the business arrangement.
166
These overlaps between friendships (whether "fictive" or "real") 167 and
relational contracts are interesting in their own right and are often overlooked
by commentators and courts. 16  The arguments offered thus far might very
well help guide thinking about how to handle such overlaps. However, some
parties to relational contracts do not have pre-existing or consequent
friendships attendant to their contractual relationship. Yet I still hope the
perspectives offered here advance our thinking about contract theory and
doctrine. In Part IV, I hope to furnish some of the intellectual payoffs of
thinking about the world of relational contracting as similar to friendships-
both for relational contract theory and for the law of contracts. But first some
words of caution.
Nothing that I have said thus far should prevent us from concluding that
friendships can encompass more than contracts and that relational contracts
can be more or less than full-scale friendships. Of course, parties in most
saying, "We weren't expecting you to take us so seriously! It is just an analogy for goodness' sake." Of
course, that is a viable retort; my sur-reply would focus on why friendship is the better analogy, essentially
Part III's argument.
165 See POSNER, supra note 5, at 150-51; accord Posner, supra note 50, at 757 ("Business is almost
always conducted in a highly social manner."). But see id. at 761-62 (recognizing that these business
friendships are not "real" friendships); Moore, supra note 122, at 727 (calling business friendships "fictive");
MACAULAY ET AL., supra note 23, at 230 n.3 ("A lawyer who deals with contracts and fails to understand the
power and the limits of trust and the social sanctions flowing from 'fictive friendships' is incompetent.").
166 Posner, supra note 50, at 756-57.
167 See supra note 165.
168 However, at least some business school professors have not missed the boat here. See Ingram &
Roberts, supra note 10, at 387; Ingram & Zou, supra note 10, at 167; DiMaggio & Louch, supra note 10, at
619; Perrone et al., supra note 10, at 422; Uzzi, Financial Capital, supra note 10, at 481; Uzzi, Sources and
Consequences, supra note 10, at 674.
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relational contracts are motivated by financial gain in a way most parties to
friendships are not, at least in the paradigmatic case of friendship. And that is
probably the best reason there is to keep these concepts in separate spheres, if
one is so inclined.169 Yet, I have endeavored here to complicate the "separate
spheres" story, 17  showing some of the transactional underpinnings of
friendships and some of the friendship-like underpinnings of relational
contracts, which may appear at first to be mere commercial enterprises.
Relational contract theory itself encourages us to stop fetishizing the separation
of contracts and social life-and I hope to have shown here how it can be
useful and illuminating to both contracts and "private" social life to understand
how these categories do not so comfortably inhabit separate spheres. We can
continue to find ways to preserve something unique and special about each
sphere. However, I fear we cannot do so by pretending that these spheres do
not interact in absolutely central ways and by creating artificial distinctions
between contracts as the jurisdiction of the law and social friendship as
existing somewhere always and necessarily outside the law.
Certainly, just as there are very close friendships that do not fit the contract
model (but do not destroy the usefulness of thinking of friendship as a
relational contract), there are types of contracts that do not fit the friendship
model. But this turns out not to be a problem for a relational contract theory
that recognizes that many contracts will have very few, if any, relational
characteristics. The less a contractual relationship resembles a friendship in
the way I have sketched it here, the less reason anyone has to treat that
relationship the way one would treat a relational contract.
Finally, I must say something about the seed of doubt I planted at the end
of Part II. If I am serious about the morphological similarities between
friendships and relational contracts, it should give me some pause that
relational contracts are often between organizations and between natural
persons and organizations, while the moral seriousness of friendship makes
sense only between natural persons. Although I might try to rebuff such a
critique by emphasizing that even friendships between organizations are
169 Indeed, this is the strategy of Ellman, supra note 37, discussed in Wightman, supra note 4, at 105-06.
Ellman concludes that the contract concept cannot be applied between intimates (his particular concern is co-
habiting lovers, not friends) because contracts are about financial gain, but personal relationships are not. Or,
put another way, in intimate relationships, the relationship is itself the goal, so there are no external standards
to apply to the relationship when a dispute arises. From the perspective of relational contract theory (which
Ellman simply dismisses with reference to Eisenberg's inadequate critiques), this is much too simplified a
story.
170 For more on this story and reasons to reject it in its simplified form, see ZELIZER, supra note 22.
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routinely the product of friendships between natural persons-and, after all,
organizations are just collectives of natural persons who are perfectly capable
of the moral seriousness of friendship-my instinct is not to push this
analogical and morphological project too far. As Daniel Markovits suggests in
connection with the limited reach of his own "collaborative" view of contract,
which similarly cannot be easily extended to cover organizations 171:
Individual persons have reasons to respect and seek community with
each other because individual persons' moral status commands that
they be treated never merely as means but always as ends in
themselves. Organizations, by contrast, have no comparable moral
status, even when they are treated, artificially, as persons at law.
Quite to the contrary, organizations should be treated precisely as
mere means, and someone who treats an organization as an end inS 172
itself makes, at least presumptively, a moral error.
Mutatis mutandis, thinking about relational contracts as friendships may trap
me into a similar moral error. Friendship is a special case of partiality, where
we are assumed to treat our friends as ends in themselves; an economic
organization should be treated only as a means. Although we can have an
emotional vulnerability to an organization and value it-alumni contributions
to educational institutions seem to reflect this relationship-it would be very
bizarre to call our ongoing relationships with these organizations friendships.
Certainly, firms as entities barely can be thought to have emotions at all. To
say they do is not as much a moral error as it is just bewildering.
Although I concede that this difference between "types" of contracts is
important in developing a general theory of contract that applies to all
contracts (though it may be a hybrid theory that actually treats organizations
under a different set of principles within contract law), 173 I am a little less
worried about the distinction for my much more modest ambitions here. After
all, I am not building a general theory of contract. I am simply observing some
counterintuitive similarities and overlaps between the concepts, suggesting that
171 Indeed, in my own analysis of Markovits's theory of contract, I focus on this shortcoming to his view.
See generally Leib, supra note 29 (elaborating on why Markovits's theory of contract does not have a neat
application to very core cases of contracts that involve organizations).
172 Markovits, supra note 19, at 1465.
173 This idea of a "second" contract law (or a "third," for all three types of contracts to which I alluded
above) is suggested as a possibility by Markovits. See generally id (examining whether organizations and
individuals require their own type of contract law). It is even developed beyond mere suggestion in MEiR
DAN-CoHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIzATIONs: A LEGAL THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 82-84,
96-102 (1986). For my discussion about this potential approach, see Leib, supra note 29, at 11-12.
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these analogies and overlaps bear some useful insights about contract law and
theory. Since I do not focus on the value of the practice of contract in
friendship (as Markovits does in respectful communities of collaboration), I do
not need to worry that many core cases of contract will not share in the moral
value of friendships (the way many core cases of contract cannot share in the
moral value of respectful communities of collaboration). For my purposes, a
comparison of relational contracts to friendships that proves useful in
analyzing the practice of contract is sufficient.
IV. FRIENDSHP, LEGALITY, FORMALITY, AND SOCIAL NORMS
In the final analysis, an analogical argument is only as powerful as what it
can illuminate. One can point out thirty-five similarities between two
concepts, but if there are no similarities that illuminate important questions, it
is hard to justify writing an article about those comparisons. Revealing the
analogies between relational contracts and friendship does, however, shed
some new light on old problems.
A. The Legal Enforceability of Friendship?
As counterintuitive as it may seem, viewing relational contracts as
friendships (and friendships as relational contracts) supports the idea that some
duties that emerge from within friendship are legally enforceable. Friends can
generate legal obligations through what may seem to be acts of friendship and
private promises. Because viewing relational contracts as friendships and
friendships as relational contracts reveals the substantial verisimilitude and
overlapping of the concepts, we cannot neatly reserve friendship for outside
the boundaries of law. This does not mean, however, that all such duties are
legally enforceable. Figuring out which promises or duties are enforceable is
no easy task for the law, but the law cannot and does not embrace an
oversimplified exclusion of all legal enforceability between friends.
Let us consider several examples. The easiest case for enforceability seems
to be a deal between good friends that meets all of contract law's classical
requirements: offer, acceptance, consideration, and the like. Very few would
suggest that the law must stay out of friendship completely to protect friends
from the law. It would certainly surprise many friends in the business world
who have transacted based on the assumption that law would enforce their
transactions, only to learn that the law will leave them to their social norms
because the law is supposed to stay out of friendships. Even if the underlying
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friendship is explicit and serves as the trust predicate for the deal itself (that is,
without the friendship, no deal would have been reached in the first place),
legal enforceability is not likely to be denied. Recognizing that many
relational contracts overlap with friendships helps us see the necessity of some
degree of enforceability, even in relational contracts that are purportedly more
reliant on social norms than the law. That the parties see their obligations as
relying on friendship at formation is no bar. If the friends meet legal
requirements, the law will enforce their agreements, regardless of what the
parties themselves think is the source of their obligations to each other. We
might say that through the use of formalities, friends "choose" the apparatus of
law, but that is not necessarily true. Usually, nothing about the threshold
question of enforceability in the standard business deal with formalities
depends on why friends are motivated to deal with one another.
But change the example slightly. Imagine two friends transacting with all
of contract law's requirements, but one says to the other prior to formation:
"Buddy, I need you to sign this form contract because my boss requires it. The
form claims to be our total deal on all points, but you know full well that I'm
going to ignore those provisions that don't really sum up the deal we've been
talking about. We're old friends and I'm not going to screw you." Formal
application of the parol evidence rule would render the side deal
unenforceable; the writing explicitly states that it controls. Yet, from the
perspective of relational contract theory, at least some of the internal norms of
the relationship should be given legal effect. Accordingly, the real deal rather
than the paper deal should prevail; friendship's duty of good faith becomes
enforceable against a form contract.174 Quite generally, the more relational a
contract-the more it involves or is like a "real" friendship-the more we are
justified in giving legal effect to friendship's duties of good faith, best efforts,
and reasonable adjustments, and the more the failure to abide by these
standards might constitute an independent breach. Rigorous application of the
174 This approach was taken in Bates v. Southgate, 31 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Mass. 1941), where the court
found that an underlying friendship between contracting parties may excuse a party from carefully investigating a form
contract for exculpatory clauses because of the good will of a friendship, and Estes v. Magee, 109 P.2d 631, 633-34
(Idaho 1940), where the court found that a doctor's release form was inapplicable against a patient who signed
only because he relied on his doctor's friendship. A more general "right to rely" on a friend that can be enforced as a
matter of contract law is supported inSpiess v. Brandt, 41 N.W.2d 561, 566-67 (Minn. 1950); Bank Leumi Trust Co.
v. Luckey Platt Or. Assocs., 665 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997); Callahan v. Callahan, 514 N.Y.S.2d
819, 821-22 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Liebergesell v. Evans, 613 P.2d 1170, 1176 (Wash. 1980); and Graffv.
Geisel, 234 P.2d 884, 890 (Wash. 1951). So it turns out that my twin models here are actually consistent with law
as applied in a range of cases.
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law's formal requirements in this class of cases seems less appropriate because
of the underlying relationship.
Or consider a friend who gives her counterpart a good deal on renting a
house she owns. 17 5 Because of the relationship, the owner charges her friend a
much cheaper rent than could be had on the open market. Because of the
friendship and a desire to avoid awkwardness, the owner does not bother with
a formal lease agreement. Still, the friends exchange a few e-mails with basic
terms about price, duration, and general expectations. Imagine that, although
the e-mails are sufficient to meet the statute of frauds requirements, nothing is
said in the e-mails about subletting, and the default rule in the jurisdiction is
that all leases are freely alienable. 176 Can the renter sublease the property to a
third party at market rate and keep the windfall? If the owner sues, what
should the result be?
From one perspective, a court might say that the default rule should
prevail-one of the risks of dealing as friends is that one can be taken
advantage of. That, after all, is the fragility and risk of friendship. Without
that fragility and risk, there may not be a way to forge a friendship. Indeed,
friendship norms require forgiveness, 177 and the owner's forgiveness might be
imputed by a court stuck with the task of intervening in the relationship (or
fashioning a remedy upon a rupture). But from another perspective, the renter
is clearly being unjustly enriched and is taking advantage of the friendship.
Why should a contract law designed to be true to the real deal between the
parties not police this opportunistic conduct of the renter?
Notice that whichever perspective one takes here, however, it is ultimately
relational-and either approach vindicates a relational approach to both
friendship and contract law. Does this mean that "relational contract as
friendship" and "friendship as relational contract" produces no answer about
what a court should do since it could do either and still be relationalist? I do
not think so; that both considerations should be within the sensitivity of the
court does not put the court in equipoise. Rather, more detail about the
motivations of the owner's "good deal," the renter's opportunism, and the
dealings between them could ultimately decide the dispute. If the renter had to
175 Thanks to Ira Eliman for his suggestions regarding this hypothetical.
176 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1995.210-270 (West 2009).
177 See generally Kim Atkins, Friendship, Trust, and Forgiveness, 29 PHILOSOPHIA 111, 111 (2002)
(arguing for a conception of forgiveness as the outcome of a process of mutuality rather than something
brought about solely by the actions of an individual).
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go to another state to take care of an ailing family member or friend and
needed the sublease's windfall to cover costs in the other state, it might make
more sense to require the owner to take the loss and adhere to the default rule.
By contrast, if it is a simple case of opportunism and preying on a friend, it is
much easier within contract law to force the renter to disgorge or share the ill-
gotten profits.
What about the realm of private promise, favor, gift, or duty, when friends
do not seem to be self-consciously entering the legal or economic sphere as
perhaps they did in the previous cases? Here too, the twin perspectives of
relational contracts as friendships and friendships as relational contracts prove
illuminating-and recommend legal enforceability as a matter of contract law
some of the time. But that it recommends enforceability some of the time is
itself an innovation given the propensity of the scholarship surrounding
"gratuitous promises" to counsel for a general policy of unenforceability in this
class of cases. 17 8
When I casually promise a friend to pick her up from an airport or promise
a friend to take in her newspaper when she is away, my friend and I rarely
contemplate legal enforceability. Indeed, one would think a friend absurd, or
not much of a friend, for demanding legal enforcement of such favors; most
would probably think a judge ridiculous for granting it. But one of the lessons
of relational contract theory more generally is that parties to relational
contracts will only rarely contemplate legal enforceability themselves. 179 Even
the modem Restatement of Contracts makes clear that "[n]either real nor
apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the
formation of a contract." 180 Thus, something other than mere contemplation
upon formation must serve as the relevant test for legal enforceability.
Although such a test may be sufficient to exclude some very private cases of
friends doing small favors for one another, 181 it is an inadequate test for
178 See, e.g., Melvin Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CAL. L. REv. 821, 847-
49(1997).
179 See, e.g., Keyes & Bums, supra note 161, at 587 ("Relational researchers have demonstrated that in
business relationships . . . 'cooperation without reference to legal entitlements is normal."' (quoting Hedley,
supra note 159, at 396)).
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1981).
181 See Macneil, RCT: C & Q, supra note 16, at 902 n.96 (suggesting that Eisenberg has in mind a
concern about the legal enforcement of "tacit household patterns about who takes out the garbage"). Whether
one needs a clear test to carve out these trivial cases is a matter of debate. The perspective of relational
contract as friendship supports Feinman's response on this front that not all social bonds are legally
enforceable, but we can only find the enforceable ones if we are willing to look at the bonds and duties in the
first place. See Feinman, supra note 15, at 748.
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contracts more generally. Relational contract theory teaches that many
business deals recognized by the law might not satisfy an "intent to form legal
relations" test. Even if we adopt the relationalists' preference for the
incorporation of social norms by the law, the law here would have to recognize
that the social norm itself counsels against legal enforceability some of the
time-but not all the time.
Does the analysis change when we enter the financial realm? Can a
"commercial purpose" or "economic activity" test work? Perhaps. Think
about a simple informal loan to a friend. Suppose a friend loans you $25,000
because you loaned her about that much when she was in financial trouble. 182
No formal papers are drawn up, and she would never have loaned that much to
a stranger without collateral of some kind. Can she enforce the debt when you
delay repayment beyond a reasonable amount of time? Or was the loan a mere
"act of friendship" that should be shielded from legal enforceability and treated
as a gift? The perspectives of friendship as relational contract and relational
contract as friendship help us see this outlay as part of an overall exchange
relationship, allowing parts of contract law to make it enforceable. To be sure,
you might have longer than usual to repay the loan' 3-and might even get a
favorable "friendship" interest rate (if you had not already agreed on one).
Perhaps you would also get an easy discharge in a bankruptcy situation. But,
most generally, it would be quite hard to argue that the obligation to repay the
loan should not be enforceable at all. 184
182 Assume, of course, that you have ignored Shakespeare's (or Antonio's) advice:
If thou wilt lend this money, lend it not
As to thy friends; for when did friendship take
A breed for barren metal of his friend?
But lend it rather to thine enemy,
Who, if he break, thou mayst with better face
Exact the penalty.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 1, sc. 3, 11. 133-38.
183 See Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1266 (arguing that friendship allows longer time horizons for debt
repayment).
184 Consider Virgin Money's recent effort to develop financial products to structure loans to friends. See
Virgin Money, http://www.virginmoneyus.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2009). It calls some of its services
"Handshake Basic" and "Handshake Plus." The former comes "smiles included," and the latter "lowers
chance of default" and "raises chance of glee." Virgin Money, Social Loans Borrowers, Lenders, and Curious
Inquirers, Welcome, http://www.virginmoneyus.com/PersonalLoans/tabid/54/Default.aspx (last visited Sept.
21, 2009). Virgin Money's motto is "to provide customers ... a top-notch private loan experience that does
good things for both [the] pocket and [the] relationship." Washington Diamond, Virgin Money,
http://www.washingtondiamond.com/Financing-Options 2 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). It appears that Virgin
bought Circle Lending, which was a company exclusively devoted to these sorts of financial products, in
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Ultimately, there is reason for equivocation about the realm of the
financial, highlighting that friendship duties do not become enforceable merely
by entering the financial sphere; it is not the case that anything that counts as a
commercial activity would qualify for enforcement. 185 When friends buy each
other rounds of drinks at a local bar for several years and then one skips out on
his responsibility before leaving town for good, does the stiffed friend have a
legal cause of action? There is undoubtedly a commercial dimension to the
relationship, but it seems reasonable here to think a friend odd for considering
such a lawsuit. Yet why is the friend odd? Not quite because a duty never
developed in the first place; on the contrary, the reciprocation of the gifts over
years can be seen as an implicit promise, leading to reasonable reliance for
reciprocation. But we would still think the friend crazy mostly because the
lawsuit would cost more than the drink. The law should not be used to enforce
this duty precisely because the law is designed to be too expensive a remedy
for such minor derelictions of duties. 186 It is not that we can rely on a simple
test of what the parties contemplated (though perhaps here parties did
contemplate the risk of being stiffed; that is also constitutive of friendship).
Nor can we rely on a test of commercial or financial activity, for that test is
met here, but no legal enforceability should follow.187
But when we up the ante in the reciprocal gift exchange (or implied
promise) context, it begins to seem harder to deny enforceability. If every year
friends took turns buying each other season tickets for the local ballet
company-an expense of several thousands of dollars-a stiffed friend might
which the default rate is unusually high (perhaps because people assume their friends won't sue them on the
default). For a story on Circle Lending (and the high default rate among friends), see Avoiding the Pitfalls of
Family Borrowing (NPR radio broadcast Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyld=6208227&sc=emaf
185 The proposal that contract law should enforce any promise with a commercial purpose or in
furtherance of economic activity is usually attributed to Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 903, 905, 937-38
(1985). Farber and Matheson acknowledge that their argument might support extending enforceability into
intimate contexts.
186 Indeed, this reality serves as a useful counterpoint to one of the arguments-given expression in
Balfour-offered by non-relationalists against the legal incorporation of social obligations: that the floodgates
of litigation will be forced wide open, burdening the courts. Given the cost of litigation, this just is not much
of a serious concern and helps reinforce the idea that private promises will tend to stay private whatever
position the law takes about enforceability. See Keyes & Burns, supra note 161, at 585 ("Existing procedural
mechanisms and costs.., deter individuals from litigating unworthy claims.").
187 What counts as "commerce," in any case, has long been a puzzle for the law. The Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is as good a proof as any that definitions of commerce are ever-changing
and quite hard to pin down. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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well pursue legal sanctions without being deemed absurd. 188 What is more, a
court would have good cause to force a friend to make good on an implied
promise to provide such season tickets so long as there was an inequity without
enforcement. 189 If the stiffed friend had already received as many tickets from
his friend as he had purchased for his friend, no cause of action should lie. The
court's job is not to keep the friendship going-that is, after all, quite clearly
the realm of the non-legal social sanction; 190 the court's role is only to prevent
and remediate serious derelictions of duties that result in substantial injury.
What this example reveals is that an "intention to form legal relations" and
tests for enforceability having to do with "commercial activity" only get us so
far when it comes to determining the legal enforceability of acts and promises
predicated on friendship; context and common sense must prevail, as
relationalists generally urge.
Consider a slightly different example, revisiting the area of
"noncommercial" private promise. My good friend calls me from the airport to
let me know she is in town. She needs to get downtown quickly for an
important meeting, and I tell her that I will be there in fifteen minutes to drive
her. She tells me that if I cannot get there within twenty minutes, she will take
public transportation. Although she would like to see me, her being on time is
"of the essence" because the meeting is with an important prospective client.
She relies on my insistence that I can help and she waits me out. She misses
the meeting, it turns out, which renders the trip a total loss. She also loses the
potential to develop a working relationship with the company she was
supposed to meet. Am I legally obligated to make her whole?
From the perspective of those who wish to keep all private duties
unenforceable, this is an easy case. If my friend sues me, we might very well
188 Some evidence that litigation over season tickets is not unusual can be found in the following line of
cases: Lipton v. Donnenfeld, 773 N.Y.S.2d 82 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Brand v. Lipton, 711 N.Y.S.2d 486
(N.Y. App. Div. 2000); Kane v. Berken, 600 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (unreported table decision);
Kully v. Goldman, 305 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1981); Davey v. King, 595 A.2d 999 (D.C. 1991); and Tauber v.
Jacobson, 293 A.2d 861 (D.C. 1972). Thanks to Joe Perillo for triggering my interest in this litigation context.
189 There is a certain parallel here with the line of cases that prevents employers from easily firing
salespeople without paying them earned commissions, finding such termination practices breaches of the
implied duty of good faith. See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977);
Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 946 (5th Cir. 1990). This line of cases is cited and discussed in STEVEN J.
BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH,
ENFORCEMENT §§ 3.2.2, 3.4.1 (1995).
190 I will discuss this limitation to the enforcement of friendship and relational contracts more generally
infra Part IV.B, since this claim contravenes some relationalists' normative conclusions about how to handle
relational contracts.
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think her odd. But it can also be analogized to the season ticket case because
there might be enough money at stake to make a lawsuit financially
worthwhile. Yet, it is hard to be sure what is appropriate for the law to do
without knowing more. Did I just flake out? Was there unforeseeable traffic?
Did I have an emergency with my child? Did I deliberately make her late
because I am actually competing with her business and wanted the same client
she was going to meet downtown?
In some of these scenarios-like the child emergency or unforeseeable
traffic-it is plausible to say that a hypothetical lawsuit should be dismissed.
Indeed, a relational contract theory that urges courts to apply internal social
norms to the relationship would likely find that within friendship there is an
implicit right to veer from strict compliance with obligations for a range of
good faith reasons. 191 But the closer I get to being negligent or intentionally
malfeasant, the less it makes sense to refuse legal enforcement of the
underlying duty. In some measure, our pre-existing friendship serves as the
source of the norms that determine whether I owe my friend any remediation.
If I acted in good faith, that is all our friendship required. If I violated my
good faith obligation to her, it is easier to say that my opportunism and
betrayal is legally cognizable.
One could reasonably ask, however, whether the duties discussed here,
when enforced, are contractual duties. Isn't the offer to pick up my friend a
gift? What is the friend's consideration? 192 What is the bargain?1 93  Is it her
forbearance from taking public transportation or a cab from the airport? That
seems thin, though perhaps it constitutes sufficient reliance for courts to apply
a "promissory estoppel" theory to get around the consideration requirement. 194
191 See Fiske & Tetlock, supra note 116, at 280 (suggesting that some obligations in the social sphere
carry with them an assumption that they can be deferred or canceled upon certain changes of circumstance).
192 The consideration doctrine would indeed prevent many promises within a friendship from becoming
legally enforceable. See, e.g., Kim v. Son, No. G039818, 2009 WL 597232 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2009)
(finding a promise literally written in blood between friends to repay money lost in a bad investment
unenforceable because the promise wasn't bargained-for). But it isn't clear that the consideration doctrine
ought to be used this way-especially in cases where it seems easy to say that the evidentiary, channeling, and
cautionary functions of the doctrine have been met. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41
COLUM. L. REv. 799 (1941) (discussing the rationale of legal formalities and an examination of the policies of
the common law consideration doctrine).
193 See Ellman, supra note 37, at 1375 ("Mutual gifting arising from mutual concern and affection is not
the same as bargained-for exchange.").
194 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Notably, in developing a remedy
in this sort of context, we probably cannot be more precise than § 90(1) already is: "[t]he remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires."
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After all, the reliance evidenced by not taking alternative transportation is
exactly what would be expected to flow from the promise to make a gift (if it is
a gift) in that context.
Relational contract as friendship and friendship as relational contract
provide an alternative answer, which does not require hemming such scenarios
into doctrines that are not designed to do the work that they would have to bear
in cases like the airport example or the season ticket hypothetical. These
examples highlight that in practices of reciprocal gift-giving, upon which
friendship is predicated, the relationship itself can generate duties that can be
recognized through contract. This is not to say that all promises to make gifts
become enforceable between friends or relational contracting partners. Nor is
the occasional enforceability of friendship's duties between friends predicated
on mere reliance or restitution, though (reasonable) reliance and unjust
enrichment may be preconditions for enforceability too. Rather, some duties
stem from the relationship itself and only make sense in that context. Under a
relational contract theory, however, nothing prevents those "status-based"
duties from being thought of and captured by contract.195 One of the benefits
of relational contract theory (to those who embrace it) is precisely its
willingness to admit promissory, reliance, restitutionary, and status-oriented
modalities of obligation into its overall structure. To be sure, a relational
contract theory will account for the possibility that some "socially valuable"
gifts "derive[] [their] value from [their] role in nonlegal relationships, and
therefore efforts to regulate it with the law [c]ould reduce its value."' 196
However, not all gifts work this way, and a pattern of reciprocal gift giving is a
signal that exchange can be enforced without degrading its value. 197  As I
suggested above, even "traditional" contract law can reach this result through
what is known as promissory estoppel-but relational contract theory puts this
type of liability as a central rather than marginal case. It also provides a
framework of reasons for enforcement and a careful method for weighing the
195 This argument draws from Wightman, supra note 4, at 125 (discussing non-bargain contract cases and
limiting them to intimate associations in which gift giving is reciprocal).
196 Posner, supra note 78, at 567.
197 For a related argument about the role of reciprocity in the enforcement of intimate obligations in the
will context, see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational
Contract, 77 N.C. L. REv. 551 (1999). To be sure, we cannot lose sight of the different ways in which gifts are
used in different relationships and how their value changes depending on the context. Frank Flynn's work
pursues this nuance, demonstrating that we should not treat all gift exchanges the same way, even within
friendships. See, e.g., Ames, Flynn & Weber, supra note 77 (explaining that gift givers may have different
reasons for giving gifts such as affect, role, or cost-benefit calculations).
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equities, even if courts want to squeeze these sorts of cases into the promissory
estoppel box, as might be expected.
Take one final example. Consider the practice of some groups of friends
who contribute to a pool of funds as a savings device or as a financial
instrument. Often organized within ethnic groups (of friends), the rotating
credit group is a way to incentivize and enforce savings in tight-knit
communities. 198 It works like this:
[A] rotating credit group typically consists of a small number of
people . ..who periodically contribute money to a pot. At the
beginning of each period, one member takes the pot. Members
determine the recipient by lottery or bidding. Failure to make timely
payments and other breaches result in nonlegal sanctions such as
criticism that, carried along the channels of gossip, injures the
defaulter's reputation and may lead to social ostracism. When
everyone has taken one pot, the group dissolves.
... [P]articipation in a rotating credit group either reduces the time
necessary to save up to buy an indivisible good or earns interest. 199
Some of these groups may formalize their deals, making this look like the
first, easy case of clear enforceability (when the groups do not otherwise run
afoul of securities, tax, lottery, or other laws, which they frequently do). But
imagine a scenario in which no deal was formalized, as is often the case. If
friends engage in this practice for a long time without formalities, can contract
law infer a legally enforceable deal?200  Or, because informal, non-legal
sanctions are what the parties really contemplate for enforcement, should the
law leave the parties as it finds them upon a party's breach of the underlying
deal? 20 1 That the relational-contract-as-friendship and friendship-as-relational-
198 The practice is described and discussed in PosNEtz, supra note 5, at 151, and in Eric A. Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Cm. L. REV.
133 (1996).
199 Posner, supra note 197, at 169-70. For a classic analysis of these practices, see Clifford Geertz, The
Rotating Credit Association: A "Middle Rung" in Development, 10 ECON. DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241
(1962).
200 One bankruptcy court has held that obligations under a rotating credit agreement are legally
enforceable. In re Ray, 51 B.R. 454, 460-61 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1985). Despite the fact that these agreements
are quite common in the United States, there is remarkably little reported litigation to guide courts when
confronting such obligations. Perhaps this is evidence that non-legal sanctions are functioning effectively.
But perhaps not; fear of legal sanctions or the legal system may also be keeping these disputes out of court.
201 For analysis of one such case, see Posner, supra note 198, at 173-75 (highlighting a case in which a
court opted to dismiss a claim trying to enforce a rotating credit agreement on the ground that it was an illegal
lottery). More generally, though, it is probably hard to say with any degree of certainty that parties
contemplate only non-legal sanctions upon default. See id. at 170 ("[A]mong West Indian immigrants in New
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contract perspectives answer with a weak "it depends" should not be
surprising, since any court faced with such a case would need to conduct a
careful study of the internal norms and expectations of the participants in the
credit group.
To say, as the relational-contract-as-friendship perspective would, that
some relational duties are legally enforceable does not mean that all are, and
courts need some way to figure out which are and which are not. This is where
relational contract theory is weakest, 20 2  but the relational-contract-as-
friendship model offers slightly more illumination. Utilizing an "intent to form
legal relations test" as courts have in other contexts,20 3 or a "commercial
purpose test" as suggested by Farber and Matheson,204 will too often leave
friends without recourse when they find themselves betrayed and will too often
ensnare friends into legal obligations they never wanted in the first place. Yet
some inquiry into the intent of the underlying deal (if one is ascertainable), an
estimate of the nature and extent of the breach, and the good faith or
opportunism of the breaching party should guide the exercise of common
sense. Promise and reliance play their part, but a fine-grained commonsensical
analysis of the status of the parties and the practice in which they are engaged
is also necessary. Courts may not be perfect at the task and perhaps should try
to shuttle these cases to mediators, arbitrators, and agencies where possible.20 5
Nevertheless, courts are not so obviously error-prone, nor are friendship duties
so clearly isolated in the social sphere, that courts should refuse enforcement
altogether by drawing a line in the sand.
York City [participating in credit circles], 'so rare was default that when queried, most organizers did not
know how they would have dealt with such a situation."' (quoting AUBREY W. BONNETT, INSTITUTIONAL
ADAPTATION OF WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANTS TO AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS OF ROTATING CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS
63-64 (1981))).
202 See Barnett, supra note 8, at 1190-91 (arguing that what differentiates a contract theory from a social
theory is an account of when an exchange relationship merits legal protection).
203 See Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 Eng. Rep. 571, 579 (K.B.) (Atkin, L.J.) (discussing the intent of a
husband and wife to form a binding contract where the husband merely promised to give his wife a monthly
stipend and observing that "the promise here was not intended by either party to be attended by legal
consequences").
204 See Farber & Matheson, supra note 185, at 904-05 ("[A]ny promise made in furtherance of an
economic activity is enforceable.").
205 See Macneil, RCT: C & Q, supra note 16, at 906. Many disputes between friends probably find
themselves in small claims court, where mediation and arbitration are quite common dispute resolution
techniques. But there is no question that the law has jurisdiction and that the courthouse doors are open for
friends to sue one another.
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Contractual obligations emerge from a multiplicity of places, whether from
consent, promise, reliance, benefits-conferred, or status-based sources. 206 The
twin models here (friendship as relational contract and relational contract as
friendship) help us see this in salient relief-and further support those who
would build a contract theory around several loci of obligation. In any given
context, "contract law" may prefer to focus liability on one of these sources of
obligation, but there is no singular organizing principle that accounts for all
contracts. We do contract law no great service by building the edifice of
contract around only one of these sources of liability, suggesting that the others
are merely exceptional cases. Relational contract theory highlights just how
misleading such models are.
207
B. Revisiting Relational Contract Law
The window into relational contract theory developed here supports many
of the theory's normative prescriptions for standard relational contracting in
business. If relational contracts are like friendships insofar as they both leave
many features of deals unspecified, and they both breed interdependence, it
might make sense to expect a higher degree of good faith, best efforts, and
reasonable adjustments between parties to such contracts, as we would with all
friendships. 208  Although these dimensions of the relationship will not be
206 Indeed, although a fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, it suffices to say that viewing
relational contract as a friendship and friendship as a relational contract may help us see why "contract
thinking" was not a "fatal flaw" at all in the cohabitation cases like Marvin v. Marvin, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal.
1976). Contra Ellman, supra note 37, at 1365, 1367. Ellman criticizes cases like Marvin for failing to apply
more status-oriented obligations to generate the liabilities the courts find in cohabitation cases through implied
contracts. Id. at 1375-77. Through the lens of relational contract theory-especially the form developed
here-it is easy to see how the theory incorporates precisely the type of status-based liabilities Ellman prefers.
His conception of contract is so narrow that he fails to see how capaciously one can plausibly and
convincingly draw "contract thinking."
207 It is probably worth noting here that friendship can play numerous roles in establishing liabilities. The
friendship can serve an evidentiary function (friendship proves there is a best efforts clause, which does not
otherwise appear in the paper deal); it can sometimes create the obligation itself through implication and
conduct (the friendship underwrites a finding of breach because friends would not rely upon or defend their
actions on the basis of caveat emptor); and it can sometimes be relevant in fashioning a remedy (because
friends betrayed one another, a specific performance order is especially unlikely to result in successful repair).
208 There is some circularity here, of course. I used the requirements of good faith in both friendship and
relational contracts as a reason to adopt the analogy in the first place, so it is a form of cheating to use the
analogy on the back end as a reason to embrace the good faith requirement in relational contracting. Although
I concede this point of circularity, it is worth noting that since the analogy also works on so many other levels
(and on levels that create the need for the good faith requirement), it seems fair to say that the twin models
ultimately "support" this normative dimension of relational contract law. In any case, when I say the models
"support" a normative prescription, I do not necessarily mean that they furnish independent reasons to embrace
2010]
HeinOnline  -- 59 Emory L.J. 713 2009-2010
EMORY LAW JOURNAL
legally enforceable all the time (as I just suggested above in the discussion of
relational contract of friendship itself), courts should carefully decide when
and how to incorporate these social norms into the parties' legal relationships.
Since these dimensions of the relationship will often be predicates for the
anticipatory trust in the contractual relationship (and violations of such norms
will be reliably opportunistic), refusing to enforce them legally would have the
perverse consequence of eroding the possibility for the relationship in the first
place.
The discussion here also can support the relationalists' case to relax rigid
requirements of offer, acceptance, definiteness, and consideration within
relational contracts. One of the most illuminating features of putting relational
contracts and friendships side by side is seeing how absolutely central
informality is in the constitution of these relationships. Just as we might
degrade or deter friendship by requiring parties to engage in formalities, so too
would we risk undermining relational contracts and their internal efficiency by
refusing to recognize their need for informality, reciprocal gift giving as
exchange, and incompleteness. By requiring formalities to get enforceability,
we are clipping the wings of relational contracts. Formalism about formation
increases contracting costs so substantially that we may never get these
contracts (or friendships) off the ground in the first place.209 The discussion
here only further supports the arguments of those relationalists who argue
against adherence to contract's "classical" restrictions in the case of relational
contracts. "Planning for litigation [through formalities] becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy." 210
As with formation, so with interpretation. The relational-contract-as-
friendship model also supports the relationalists' commitment to deeply
contextual interpretation over formalistic modes of interpretation that would
only give effect to a paper deal. When friendship is concerned, there are
the normative prescription, but rather that they are consistent with the prescription in ways that help us
understand it better as a feature of relational contract theory.
209 See Ingram & Zou, supra note 10, at 170 ("In a business context, the benefit of relational exchange is
to lower transaction costs, and related, to enable some transactions which would be otherwise impossible.").
But see Cross, supra note 22, at 1501 (arguing that sometimes resort to legal formalities and sanctions is
necessary to get relational contracts off the ground in a commercial context outside of close-knit groups).
Even in cases in which relational contracts can only get off the ground with some resort to legal formalities,
there is no reason to require them (as non-relationalists would) when parties otherwise do not want them
because, presumptively, the parties view formalities as undermining the relationship.
210 Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 209, 235. This is, admittedly, an
ironic use of Ribstein.
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equitable reasons to enable judges to look behind the paper deals to the real
deals. Seeing a relational contract as partaking in the morphology of
friendship helps support the case for this equitable peek at the real deal in
relational contracts too. Relational contracts, like friendships, are complex
relationships that need to keep some obligations incomplete to function
properly; those agreements adjust over time. But just because those
obligations develop over time without strict formalities does not make them
any less obligatory-and does not make their violation any less a breach of the
parties' real deal. Courts need the freedom to enforce those implicit
dimensions of contracts to keep those relationships from being abused. Non-
legal sanctions help, but they may not be strong enough to deter serious cases
of opportunism. Moreover, formalism in interpretation also enhances
contracting costs substantially and risks threatening the entire enterprise.
Ultimately, formalism just does not make sense for relational contracts-
whether from the coherentist impulse that we ought to have a law that
reasonably tracks how people actually do business, the economic standpoint
that we ought not force people into contracting costs that they need not
undertake (after all, most contracts succeed and parties rarely have to worry
about court intervention), the economic standpoint that forcing ex ante
bargaining risks rupturing the trust and solidarity the relationship already
establishes, or the normative standpoint that the cost of formalism is routine
injustice and there is no benefit substantial enough to outweigh it. Even if
formalism is possible and desirable in discrete transactions in which there is no
friendship or relationship to speak of (or in which such a description is plainly
too attenuated to take seriously), such a technique cannot and should not be
used to marginalize the real deal that parties enter into and rely on within
relational contracts. Thus, the discussion here further underscores
relationalists' lack of sympathy for formalism in relational contract disputes.
Yet, not all of the relationalists' normative prescriptions withstand scrutiny
when viewed from within the models explored here. For example, to the
extent that some relationalists have urged that relational contracts should be
treated like partnerships and that courts should "adapt or revise the terms of
ongoing relational contracts in such a way that an unexpected loss that would
otherwise fall on one party will be shared by reducing the other party's
profits, '211 those prescriptions are supported by the relational-contract-as-
marriage model much better than they are by the relational-contract-as-
211 Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 817-18.
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friendship model. Although friendship has a basis in equality, nothing about
friendship suggests that people in it are only selfless and other-regarding. I
have argued elsewhere that very close friends might be required to serve as
fiduciaries for one another, with attendant duties of loyalty or unselfishness. 2
12
However, the average case of friendship does not require full-scale loyalty and
a lack of self-interest. While marriage is generally such a partnership, in which
egalitarian sharing is a worthy aspiration, friendship does not present the same
case for legally-enforced equality. Accordingly, the model of relational-
contract-as-friendship provides a basis for revising this normative dimension of
relational contract theory. Friendship certainly envisions the parties acting in
good faith, but good faith does not mean partnership in the vast majority of
cases.
Furthermore, the relational-contract-as-friendship model suggests a reason
to be skeptical about the desire of some relationalists to use the law to keep
213relationships and relational contracts together. Although fighting
opportunism within relational contracts is a desirable goal from the standpoint
of any relational contract theory, the fixation on relationship preservation
evident in much relational theory does not resonate as well with the relational-
contract-as-friendship model. Indeed, the relationship-preservation element of
some relational contract theory may very well be traceable to the relational-
contract-as-marriage model, where a relationship-preservation posture is not
uncommon. Within friendships we tend to make exit easier than within
marriages, and contract law that is animated by an account of relational-
contract-as-friendship would likely focus on enabling exit more than
preserving a relationship. 214 This does not mean that parties should be free to
shirk a vested obligation-like the hypothetical party who gets free season
tickets under the assumption that he will pay for the round of season tickets
next year but exits the relationship before his turn to pay comes due. But once
the vested obligation is discharged, the law should not waste any resources
disabling free exit.215
212 See generally Leib, supra note 22 (arguing that courts should sometimes apply a tailored law of
fiduciaries to enforce legal duties between friends).
213 One can see this dimension of relational contract theory on display in Speidel, supra note 8, at 839,
846.
214 To be sure, Speidel highlights that even using law to preserve the relationship does not really deprive
parties of their underlying right to agree to terminate by negotiating their way out of obligation. Id. at 846.
But from the perspective of relational contract as friendship, a relational contract law should allow parties to
break up easily if that is what they want to do-so long as they are no longer in debt to one another.
215 There is some inchoate research in business schools and sociology departments that investigates the
deterioration of business friendships (though focused largely on workplace friendships)--and such research
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C. The Debasement/Crowding Thesis: Social Norms and Legal Norms
Playing Nicely Together
The perspectives afforded by the friendship-as-relational-contract and
relational-contract-as-friendship models also shed some new light on an old
critique of relational contract theory's normative suggestions. In short, non-
relationalists routinely reject relational contract theory's normative suggestion
that the law incorporate social norms because doing so would risk threatening
the very foundation and value of the relationships themselves. To give legal
effect to social or relational norms debases the social norms and the
relationships themselves because they are intended to and always should
remain outside the sphere of law.
2 16
This longstanding claim of non-relationalists cannot be taken lightly, and it
cannot be definitively resolved here. It is, however, a version of the"crowding" thesis217-that law crowds out trust relationships-about which
much ink has been spilled. Here is one way of putting the crowding critique:
What if legal regulation of the "strong form" 218 trust in friendships actually
served to crowd it out altogether? If law replaces trust by intervening and
enforcing social norms, a regime of trust enforcement through incorporation of
social norms would actually undermine the very important brand of trust it was
seeking to protect by incorporating it into the law. The effort to protect
friendships (mostly by punishing bad and false friends) would have the
perverse effect of discouraging them.
The models erected here, however, make a modest contribution to the
debate about these issues. They support the claims of those who are generally
suspicious of the crowding thesis, and they tend to provide reasons to reject the
may help courts and scholars develop protocols for dealing with contractual breaches in light of deteriorating
business friendships. See Ingram & Zou, supra note 10, at 181 (citing Patricia M. Sias et al., Narratives of
Workplace Friendship Deterioration, 21 J. Soc. PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 321 (2004); Patricia M. Sias & Tara
Perry, Disengaging from Workplace Relationships A Research Note, 30 HUMAN CoMM. RES. 589 (2004)).
216 For a nice approach to the debasement thesis from within the philosophy of friendship, see Neera K.
Badhwar, Friendship and Commercial Societies, 7 POL. PHIL. & EcON. 301 (2008). Although Badhwar is
concerned with a somewhat different theoretical concern-that market societies generally debase friendship-
her response to it (that market relationships and friendships actually have much in common) is pertinent here.
217 The "crowding" thesis is explored in, for example, BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY (1997);
Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 131 (2001); and Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REv. 553, 568-71 (2001). See also
sources cited supra note 22.
218 See generally Jay B. Barney & Mark H. Hansen, Trustworthiness as a Source of Competitive
Advantage, 15 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 175 (1994) (developing the concept of "strong form trust"); see also
Ribstein, supra note 217, at 558-68.
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"debasement" critique offered by non-relationalists. In particular, the
friendship-as-relational-contract and relational-contract-as-friendship models
reveal the supplementary rather than substitutional nature of law to social
norms.2 19 Because the domains of relational contract and friendship so often
overlap and because they are so similarly structured, it is much easier to see
that the admixture of these spheres (in actual practical terms and in
morphological similarity) disables us from treating trust and intimate relations
as divorced from law completely.2 20  Quite the opposite turns out to be true.
Friendship and the trust afforded therein is a routine predicate for entering into
legal relations, and legal relations serve to develop trust upon which intimate
relations can develop. Accordingly, it is altogether too simple to assume that
the law's occasional incorporation of friendship's social norms will disable
them from doing their work in promoting voluntary cooperation. As the
discussions here reveal, voluntary cooperation relies on a complex mix of legal
and social norms, and the occasional incorporation of some social norms into
legal norms will not serve to undermine them altogether. Indeed, friendships
occasionally will need the support of legal institutions to give potential friends
and relational contracting partners the social trust necessary to enter these
complex relationships at the outset. None of this is to say that legal and social
norms do not interact, only that they are not either/or propositions.
Those who would press the crowding thesis further might suggest that legal
enforcement of the duties of friendship would deter people from entering into
these relationships. 221 And we would be much less enriched in a world with
fewer friendships. Yet, assuming friendship has both intrinsic value and some
instrumental value, friendship provides so many of its own incentives for entry
(and it is so easy to exit when the costs grow too great) that it is hard to
imagine that occasional legal enforcement of a friendship duty would actually
deter people from establishing and developing their friendships. The
enforcement will be rare, in any case, because both social norms and legal
costs will keep litigants out of court most of the time. It is unusual that a duty
has sufficient value to make it worth suing to enforce it in the first place, and
given reasonable limitations-in particular, that the law should intervene only
219 Admittedly, business school professors already seem to know that formal contracts and informal norms
can complement rather than substitute for one another. See supra note 64. It is not fully clear why there is
virtually no uptake of this work within the legal academy.
220 See generally ZELIZER, supra note 22 (undermining the "separate spheres" story).
221 But see Scott & Scott, supra note 6, at 1247 ("[C]ontract and commitment are quite compatible."); id.
at 1330 ("[L]egal enforcement of long term commitments is a particularly valuable method of bolstering
extralegal norms.").
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upon a substantial default from a social norm in which legal enforcement is
not specifically or impliedly negated-it is fair to conclude that the law will do
little to prevent people from forming and enjoying friendships. 222 We burden
family all the time with special legal duties, but this does not tend to crowd out
trust in that context either.
A second way to think about the crowding thesis is that legal enforcement
of the social norms of trust and friendship would interfere with friendship
itself. This is another way of thinking about the "debasement" thesis that is not
a "just-so" claim about what friendship needs to retain its value. The "just-so"
debasement thesis fails because it is predicated on a conception of legal
enforcement of contracts that includes only contracts between strangers and a
conception of intimate relations that is altogether too pure or Pollyannaish.223
As Ribstein puts the refined thesis, "In short, legal coercion does not help
develop norms of trustworthiness or of trust. Moreover, . . . regulation
impedes development of trust norms by interfering with opportunities to be
genuinely trusting or trustworthy." 224
But viewing friendship-as-relational-contract and relational-contract-as-
friendship further undermines this line of argumentation. The argument seems
predicated on the assumption that one can have either strong-form trust that
operates outside the law or legally-policed trust, and that in any given context
they must be substitutes rather than complements. But that assumption-
explicit in Ribstein's work 225-virtually guarantees the crowding conclusion.
In any case, the premise is flawed. It simply is not true that "the fact that there
is some reliance on the threat of sanctions mean[s] that there will be no room
for trust. ' 226  The discussions here help show why that assumption is false:
trust relationships and legal relationships are mutually reinforcing in many
cases. Indeed, as Larry Mitchell has argued, "certain preconditions, like a
legal system sustaining the values of trust, are necessary for trust to
222 This paragraph (and some of what follows) draws upon my discussion of the crowding thesis in Leib,
supra note 22, at 726-32. In that work, I also develop an argument about legal enforcement's "information-
forcing" dimension within friendships.
223 For a discussion of the assumption underlying the debasement thesis, see Bagchi, supra note 2 , at 3-5
and Kimel, supra note 3, at 253-55.
224 Ribstein, supra note 214, at 567.
225 Id. at 568 ("[L]aw must be regarded as a substitute for rather than complement of social capital
because it undermines the institutions that create it.").
226 ANNETTE C. BAIER, Trust andAntitrust, in MORAL PREJUDICES: ESSAYS ON ETHICS 118, 139 (1994).
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flourish., 227  Law makes trust possible, in part-even the strong form
necessary for open-ended relationships like relational contracts and
friendships. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Eric Posner is right that "law only
matters when a lawsuit occurs." 22
8
A related observation: Those who write about social norms and legal norms
routinely fail to recognize that these norms cannot be so neatly divided into
separate spheres. Indeed, at least some of the "debasement" thesis requires a
strict separation. But consider when we can say that "the law" intervenes. It is
often present as a back-stop and only rarely finally disposes of a dispute. Even
when a dispute arises that seems to be addressed through non-legal sanctions,
an implicit calculation not to use legal options may be in the background. Or
what about when a dispute arises and one party tells the other that she thinks
she has some legal rights in play? Is a decision by the threatened party to
relent and reach a negotiated settlement obviously a legal one, traceable to the
use of legal rhetoric? Or do social norms supplement this situation, proving,
again, that the social and legal work in tandem all the time? What about when
one party sends a lawyer's letter to the other? Is that a legal sanction, even
though the law is not applied directly and coercively? When a dispute is
arbitrated after such a missive, can we say for certain which norm
accomplished the compliance and settlement? Does a mere whiff of law
mentioned in a letter replace all the work social norms do to structure the
parties' negotiations? Or what about after a complaint is filed but before either
party spends money on discovery? Is a settlement triggered by the filing of a
law suit-rather than a disposition of law itself by a black-robed individual-a
clear case of settling merely a legal dispute? Or, were social norms of
settlement and reputational concerns also in play? In short, to the extent that
non-relationalists fear that social norms will be crowded out once the law has
taken an interest in them, they would do well to remember how porous these
categories are and how often the two types of norms mix to produce
compliance. The mixture is likely to reveal itself early and often in relational
contracts and friendships.
There is yet a further reason to be skeptical of the crowding thesis.
Crowding is most likely to result-and most likely to serve as a substitute
rather than a complement-only when there is an environment of perfect
227 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 204
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
228 POSNER, supra note 5, at 63.
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enforcement, in which legal norms perfectly incorporate all social norms. That
does not happen for reasons we have already seen (for example, only some
social norms are appropriate for the law to enforce; the law is costly; and there
is stigma associated with suing our friends and relational contract partners so
that we are very unlikely to use the law even when legal options are available)
and for reasons I am about to develop. In the legal landscape of very imperfect
enforcement and regulation, as in contract law, trust is far from crowded out.
Thus, to the extent there is any crowding, law will only make small incursions
into our friendships' strong-form trust; the law will help police only major and
costly defections but will not intrude too heavily on social norms, which will
continue to function.
Finally, there is, perhaps, a more philosophical rendering of the debasement
thesis that can also be shown to be erroneous with the help of the concepts
developed here. This form of the argument emphasizes that the very value of
friendship's duties inheres in their unenforceability. Once those duties are
backed by sanctions, the normative force and communicative potential of
compliance becomes eroded.229 The concern seems to be that friendship itself
ceases to be an independent reason for compliance once legal enforceability
enters the picture.
But there are several reasons to reject this line of argumentation. First, it is
too simplistic to assume that the value of friendship inheres in "voluntary"
compliance. People comply with their friendship duties for all sorts of reasons.
A sense of obligation in friendship is common, whether that sense comes from,
at the extreme, a fear of being sued or, more usually, a fear of a non-legal
sanction. In short, although it is true that the type of sanction may have some
quantum of effect on the communicative potential of compliance (and I just
endeavored to show that the line between social and legal sanctions is probably
overdrawn, in any case), sanctions are available even if the law does not show
its hand. This means that if we insist that the value of friendship comes from
"voluntary" compliance, we are likely to find that friendship is not valuable
very often at all. This is not a likely conclusion.
Second, no matter what your contract theory or theory of friendship, many
contracts between friends will be enforceable. Relational contract theory has
revealed that a great deal of contracting occurs among friends-and virtually
229 See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Theory of Contracts, in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 206
(Peter Benson ed., 2001) (arguing for a form of the debasement thesis); Bagchi, supra note 21, at 19 (citing
Meir Dan-Cohen, In Defense of Defiance, 23 PHIL. & PuB. An. 24 (1994)); Eisenberg, supra note 178, at 850.
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all agree that contracts between friends will be legally enforceable. If that is
right, any contract that exists between friends will kill the friendship unless we
insist on a policy of non-enforcement for all such contracts. Even those who
embrace the debasement thesis likely would reject this conclusion,
notwithstanding the reality that friends will never know if compliance was
achieved through the threat of legal sanctions or simply because of the
friendship.230
Third, parties to friendships routinely engage in both altruistic and selfish
reasoning all the time; friends do not expect anything different and only hope
for generosity when it most matters. Friendship as a possible motivation for
action is not any less independent when other instrumental factors are
considered side by side. Choosing certain instrumental reasons as motivations
can risk diluting friendship, to be sure, but the existence of different reasons
does not always challenge the realm of friendship. Motivations from
friendship that compete with other motivations need not be seen to erode
interpersonal relationships at all. Moreover, in light of the under-
compensatory nature of possible legal sanctions (which I shall address
presently), in most cases there is plenty of room for the "independent reason"
of friendship to prove itself as the prime motivation for undertaking
compliance.
D. The Under-compensatory Nature of Contractual Remedies
The window into relational contracts and friendships developed here may
also shed some light upon the question of why remedies in contract are
dramatically under-compensatory. Generally speaking, one cannot recover in a
contract suit for emotional distress, for punitive damages, upon "penalty"
clauses, for uncertain or speculative damages, for unforeseeable damages, or
for attorneys' fees. Indeed, it is generally quite difficult to get specific
231performance, which is the performance you are actually owed. In short, an
aggrieved party to a case is almost never made whole irrespective of the
measure of damages awarded. Even an award of specific performance does
230 Bellia makes a similar argument, relying on friendship as the quintessential interpersonal relationship.
See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 22, at 36 n.38.
231 These are not controversial claims requiring elaborate citation. See generally POSNER, supra note 5, at
164 (showcasing the ways that contract law's remedies are under-compensatory).
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not really make the aggrieved party whole, since she had to sue to get it and
cannot get her attorneys' fees back.232
Multiple theories have, of course, been offered to explain these pervasive
policies within contract law from the perspective of classical and neo-classical
contract theory. And, indeed, most relationalists concede that the law as it
stands is not perfectly explained by relational theory, which self-consciously
highlights how much the law is driven by an assumption of contracts between
strangers. 233 Nevertheless, the perspective developed here might contribute to
understanding this dimension of contract law.
The view of relational contracts as friendships and friendships as relational
contracts in part suggests why contract law is designed this way. That is,
contract law is under-compensatory because it is structured to minimize
incursions into private ordering, especially when a thick set of social norms is
likely to govern transactions. One can see this embedded design feature of
contract law as further evidence that we should not worry too much about the"crowding" thesis. The law does not crowd out trust precisely because its
interventions leave plenty of room for non-legal sanctions to do their work.
That is, even if the "crowding" thesis were true-a point not conceded here-it
is substantially mitigated when the legal norms are themselves largely under-
compensatory. This underscores their supplementary rather than substitutional
nature. Perhaps if the law perfectly tracked "moral" non-legal obligations, it is
possible that people would no longer be able to distinguish their friendship
motivations from their business motivations (though having two motivations
hardly kills the possibility for being a good friend, as I explored above). By
leaving room open for social norms to function even when a party invokes the
law, parties can continue to act upon and defy social norms.
However, this does highlight yet another point about relational contract
theory. Its insistence on "incorporating" social norms is actually doubly
232 For this reason, although I am largely sympathetic to Stephen A. Smith's effort to see contract
damages as still leaving room for parties to act on non-legal reasons, see Stephen A. Smith, Performance,
Punishment and the Nature of Contractual Obligation, 60 MOD. L. REv. 360, 362-63, 368, 370 (1997), I do
not think specific performance needs to be seen as an exceptional remedy from this perspective. Specific
performance is also under-compensatory, leaving room for non-legal sanctions to do their work.
233 But see Kimel, supra note 3, at 235-43 (specifying an "empirical-doctrinal" argument from within the
relationalist camp, which aims to show that "contract law already recognizes and is significantly informed by
the relational nature of contracting"). For additional articles developing this line of argumentation, see for
example, DAvID CAMPBELL, The Relational Constitution of the Discrete Contract, in CONTRACT AN)
ECONOMIC ORGANISATION 40 (David Campbell & Peter Vincent-Jones eds., 1996) and Campbell & Collins,
supra note 55, at 25-32.
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misleading and leads to many mistaken characterizations of it. I am hopeful
that my discussions here help clarify these confusions. First, as we have
already seen, sometimes the relevant social norm is precisely to preclude legal
enforcement altogether. This does not undermine relational theory's
incorporation thesis, but it can be missed when it is, as it is so often,
caricatured. Second, and more relevant here, although social norms are meant
to be translated into contracts by finding that contracts have formed and
interpreting them in accordance with the real deals that the parties
contemplated, we cannot forget that when it comes to remedies, the law always
remains under-compensatory, whatever the social norms. That is for good
reason, too. This will leave some room for the non-legal sanctions and
recognize that the predication of the relationship outside the law should have
some force.234 As we saw in the previous section, although the crowding thesis
is probably false in its most extreme form, we have to worry about it most in
an environment of perfect enforcement. Yet contract law perhaps already
incorporates a defense mechanism against crowding.
In any case, even standard contract damages might not veer all that far from
what we might expect friends to owe one another upon a breach. Consider
Raz: "Normally our responsibility to make good harm we cause to others
depends on fault .... Friends have a no-fault obligation to each other though
normally it does not require full compensation." 235 Thus, from the perspective
of relational contract as friendship, we can begin to understand why remedies
are triggered without fault as a general matter and why they do not require full
compensation; under-compensation suffices. Still, none of this is to suggest
that fault is not relevant in all sorts of ways when assessing contractual liability
234 Accordingly, Bagchi's recent effort to reserve only reliance-based recovery for those situations in
which seemingly social promises are deemed enforceable is an unnecessary and unwelcome overlay where the
law of remedies is concerned. Bagchi, supra note 21, at 5. As I have endeavored to explain here, all relational
contracts will have a complex matrix of social promises and more formal ones. The law cannot and should not
build an artificial separation between these spheres (though it will have to sort out with common sense which
promises and duties to enforce and which not to), whether through the law of remedies or otherwise. Since the
law of remedies leaves social obligations to remedy themselves in part in all cases-even cases in which the
law intervenes-those who want to have an untouchable symbolic space for non-legal relationships already
have it in the law of remedies. Forcing these obligations into a reliance box within the law of remedies is
unnecessary and pays too much homage to a promise-based account of contract. Moreover, the urge to keep
expectancy damages "pure" of promises that occur between intimate friends misconstrues expectancy as much
more fully compensatory than it actually is.
235 RA, supra note 116, at 211.
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and its magnitude; 236 nor is it to suggest that friendship will not often demandmore than the law of remedies will ever provide.
Yet the general argument here is that it is not necessarily a bad thing for
friendship to demand more than contract law will ever give. Indeed, this very
divergence helps alleviate some of the recent concern expressed by Seana
Shiffrin,237 who finds the divergence between promissory norms in private life
(say, between friends) and contract norms disabling for the moral agent. Quite
the reverse may be true: Contract law's divergence from social norms is a good
thing that provides a realm of freedom for social norms. The under-
compensatory nature of contractual remedies makes that possible without
forcing the vulnerable and those who are victims of another party's
opportunism to be wholly without recourse. This divergence may, after all, be
just what an honest relational theory would predict-internal social norms
would enforce substantial breaches with relatively modest remedies so that
non-breaching parties are not left too badly off, but would rely on non-legal
sanctions to enforce most of the deal. Even if this balance of legal and non-
legal sanctions is not contemplated by every relational contract, it is a decent
approximation of most, helps explain why the law is the way it is, and dulls
some of the bite of the "crowding" thesis.
CONCLUSION
Little in this Article is likely to have convinced a non-relationalist to jump
aboard the relationalist bandwagon-or minivan, really-in contract theory.
Indeed, it may confirm that relationalists tend to go astray in just the ways
opponents most fear: toward the judicialization of intimate relations. Still, my
ambitions here were relatively modest. I have only tried to give relational
theory some new life, sharpening some of the theory's claims against its
competitors by refracting the relational theory of contract through an analogy
to friendship. I have also offered a provocation about friendship's contractual
structure that should be less threatening once it is seen as a relational contract
of sorts. Finally, I have argued that the relational-contract-as-marriage model,
which has currency among relationalists, should be replaced with a model of
relational contract as friendship. The new models developed here (friendship
as relational contract and relational contract as friendship) are more honest to
236 See generally Richard Craswell, When Is Willful Breach 'Willful'? The Link Between Definitions and
Damages, 107 MICH. L. REv. 1501 (2009) (discussing bad faith as a basis for a remedy in contractual breaches
and as a basis for liability in establishing breach).
237 See Shiffrin, supra note 21, at 709-13.
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relational contract theory, to marriage, and to friendship, and they help
relational contract theory produce some new insights, support old ones, and
revise some of its normative agenda.
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